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.when one maintains a trace of childhood within 
him ••. He seems to take part in the restitution of the 
power of abolished dreams." Gaston Bachelard (1971). 
The Poetics of Reverie. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon 
Press, pp. 133-134. 
"To find an event in memory, it is necessary to construct 
a plausible scenario for that event's occurrence, thus 
using essentially the same mechanisms necessary to 
understand the original event. Retrieval is therefore 
a process of re-understanding the experience •••• " 
(Reisser, Black, & Kalamarides, 1985 in press, p. 2; 
emphasis in original) 
"There are no indifferent or nonsensical recollections • 
• • • We remember those events whose recollection is 
important for a specific underlying psychic tendency •• 
Every memory is dominated by a goal-idea which directs 
the personality-as-a-whole." (A. Adler, quoted by 
Ansbacher, 1947/1979, p. 6) 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The present study examines the influence of emotional "states" 
upon the content and recollection of very old autobiographical memor-
ies, more specifically of early childhood memories (EMs). Two 
questions are the major focus of the research. First, does the 
current emotional state of the rememberer bias retrieval processes 
toward memories with emotional content similar to or CQD.gruent with 
the rememberer's emotional state? This mood biasing influence has 
been referred to by Bower (1981) as mood-dependent retrieval (MDR) 
because there is evidence that emotions can act as powerful retrieval 
cues for mood-congruent memories. And, second, do emotions encoded 
in EMs show any type of patterning or organization such as that 
found in the naturalistic expression of emotional "states" (Diener 
& Emmons, 1985; Plutchik, 1980). More precisely, will the circumplex 
pattern between emotions identified by Plutchik (1980) in the natur-
alistic expression of emotions also be found in the patterning between 
emotions encoded in memories of early childhood? 
At a theoretical level the current study has two goals. The 
first is to contribute data relevant to understanding the manner in 
which the contents of a person's autobiographical memory can be 
thematically related (McAdams, 1985) to the emotional aspects of 
1 
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personality and motivational processes. The second is to demonstrate 
that models of the relationship between cognition, emotion, and 
memory (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Clarke & Fiske, 1982; Clark, Milberg, & 
Ross, 1983; Izard, Kagan, & Zajonc, 1984) can be further refined by 
considering qualities of the naturalistic expression of emotional 
states (Diener & Emmons, 1985; Izard, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; 
Polivy, 1981). 
The literature pertinent to the present study is organized as 
follows. Research and theory on the psychological significance of 
EMs will be briefly reviewed. It will become apparent that further 
insight into the memory processes mediating thematic continuity is 
needed. One avenue toward such insight may be found through what is 
known of emotional influences upon memory. Evidence that emotions 
do influence memory processes will be discussed, and Bower and 
Cohen's (1982) model of such influences will be considered. Research 
inconsistent with it is analyzed and attributed to methodological 
failures to control for the intensity, similarity, and polarity 
parameters of emotional states. Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model 
incorporating these dimensions of emotions will then be presented 
and used to formulate several hypotheses about the emotional content 
and recollection of EMs. A study testing these hypotheses is pre-
sented and discussed. 
Current Perspectives on Early Childhood Memories 
Many psychologists (Manaster & Corsini, 1982; Mayman, 1968; 
Olson, 1979) consider EMs to be the simplest and most effective 
method available for the "projective" assessment of personality and 
motivational processes. The contrasting theoretical viewpoints of 
Freud (1901/1965) and Adler (1956, 1969) have guided the projective 
use of EMs. While Freud believed that the content of EMs was often 
"screened" or altered by later defensive processes, Adler argued 
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that EM content was a transparent reflection of the goals, motiva-
tions, and life-style of the rememberer. What unites these theorists 
is their common belief that EM content could be analyzed to reveal 
significant information about the development, personality, and 
motivations of the individual. 
There is, indeed, evidence to support the thematic relatedness 
of EM content to various descriptive features of the personality and 
motivational processes of the rememberer (Olson, 1979). Three 
studies are described below. 
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) evaluated Freud's (1901/1965) 
hypothesis that "screen memories" (the characteristics of which are 
described in the Methods section of the current report) reflect con-
flict and anxieties originating during the "Oedipal period" of 
psychosexual development. They found indirect support for this 
argument in that such memories were significantly correlated with 
current anxiety and defensiveness as assessed by psychometrically 
refined personality assessment devices. 
Clear and direct support for Adler's perspective can be found 
in the studies of Lord (1971) and McAdams (1982). Lord (1971) found 
that positivity-negativity of affect, and activity-passivity as a 
mode of problem resolution in EM content was significantly correlated 
with similar themes in the thematic content of various other projective 
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and non-projective assessment methods (e.g., the Rorschach, Thematic 
Apperception Test, Draw-a-Person Technique, and interviews regarding 
vocational goals). McAdams (1982) demonstrated a similar type of 
thematic relatedness between power and intimacy motivation and more 
recent, rather than "early," autobiographical recollections. He 
found that themes of power and intimacy in Thematic Apperception Test 
protocols and in the content of recent particularly positive, or "peak 
experience" memories were significantly correlated. Lord (1971) pro-
vided data on the reliability of thematic coding and McAdams (1982)pro-
vided both reliability and validity information for his scoring system. 
These demonstrations of the thematic relatedness of EM content 
to the rememberer's emotional state, motivational processes, and 
personality style lend credence to the use of autobiographical 
recollections such as EMs for assessment purposes (Olson, 1979). 
However, demonstrations of correlations between EM content and the 
characteristics of the rememberer require rather than provide further 
understanding of the underlying processes of memory mediating such 
relationships (Kihlstrom, 1981). On the basis of their own study 
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) make the following appraisal: 
A major problem for studies of personality and memory is 
to explicate the relations between what is accessible in an 
individual's autobiographical memory, the way in which these 
memories are retrieved and reconstructed in the specific 
instance, and other features of personality. (p. 145) 
There are, therefore, two issues faced by investigators 
attempting to pursue the relation between personality and memory 
as identified by these authors. The first involves identifying 
the relation between personality and memory; and the 
second is explaining the relationship. There appear to be at least 
two ways in which personality may be related to and influence 
memory. Each has consequences for the second issue of providing a 
plausible account of the mechanisms involved. The first assumes 
that personality may ultimately be "translated into strategic cogni-
tive activity" (Shower & Cantor, 1985, p. 276). This links person-
ality and memory by assuming they are both a type of cognitive 
process. This approach at least partially addresses the second 
issue since "personality" (as strategic cognition) and memory can 
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then be discussed in the same language, e.g., of information-proces-
sing. This notion has met wide acceptance (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1981; 
Clarke & Fiske, 1982; Fiske & Taylor, 1981; Hamilton, 1983; Izard, 
KaEan, & Zajonc, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1985; Mancuso & Ceely, 1980; 
Markus, 1980). Critics, however, wonder whether there might not be 
certain "unique features" (Greenwald, 1981) to personality that are 
overlooked in this theoretically reductive translation (Pervin, 1984, 
1985; Tomkins, 1979). 
A second way to conceptualize the relation between personality 
and memory gives to each equal status as independent but temporally 
interactive psychological systems (Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 
1984; Royce & Powell, 1984). A difficulty for this approach has 
been identifying the processes through which they interact. 
A possible resolution to this quandry may have been antici-
pated by Schachtel (1947, 1959) in his theoretical analysis of the 
apparent "amnesia" most individuals have for memories of events much 
before the age of four or five years. Drawing upon Bartlett's. (1932) 
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theory of memory, Schachtel argued that the cognitive "schemata" of 
the child and adult are too dissimilar for the adult's schemas to act 
as effective retrieval cues for childhood memories. An interesting 
feature of Schachtel's theory was the manner in which adult-child 
differences were conceptualized. The developmental change influencing 
memory was the relative extent to which emotions suffused and shaped 
experiences. The adult's cognitive processes are more strongly con-
ventionalized and schematic because they are shaped by language and 
socialization. Whereas, Schachtel argues, the child's perception and 
thought are shaped more by emotional and sensory processes. The 
final step in the argument was the assumption that EM content was 
saturated by such emotional and sensory content. Since the adult's 
thought processes showed less of this content they could no longer 
function as effective retrieval cues for the memories. 1 
Schachtel's (1947) account of childhood "amnesia" depends upon 
a principle of memory functioning called the "encoding specificity 
principle" (Tulving, 1983). This principle of memory retrieval 
states that "what is stored is determined by what is perceived and how 
it is encoded, and what is stored determines what cues are effective 
in providing access to what is stored" (Tulving & Thomson, 1973, p. 
353). There is extensive empirical support for the validity of this 
model of memory retrieval (Houston, 1984; Spear, 1978; Tulving, 1983, 
1The validity of Schachtel's psychoanalytic account of develop-
mental changes is not the issue here. Recently, White and Pillemer 
(1979) have used Piagetian theory to make the same essential argument 
but attribute the key developmental changes to alterations in cogni-
tive structures. 
1984). The interesting suggestion made by Schachtel (1947, 1959) is 
that temporal and developmental fluctuation in the manifestation of 
emotional-motivational processes in thought content may influence the 
accessibility and retrievability of EMs. 
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Recent evidence that emotions may serve as powerful and influ-
ential encoding and retrieval contexts for memories (Bower, 1981, 1983; 
Gilligan & Bower, 1984) makes Schachtel's (1947) argument all the 
more intriguing in light of the two perspectives on the relation of 
personality and memory discussed earlier. Viewing emotions as one 
of the "other features of personality" alluded to by Kihlstrom and 
Harackiewicz (1982) makes one wonder whether there might not be cer-
tain "unique features" (Greenwald, 1981) of emotions which influence 
memory but cannot be reduced to or explained by cognitive processes. 
Early childhood recollections have consistently been shown in 
survey studies to have strong and predominant emotional content 
(Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933, 1941; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982; 
Walfogel, 1948; Wynne & Schaffzin, 1965). In addition, three recent 
theoretical discussions focusing on various aspects of childhood 
memories have asserted that strongly emotional EMs are the ones most 
likely to show thematic relatedness to the personality of the remem-
berer (Epstein, 1983; McAdams, 1985; Tompkins, 1979). Therefore, one 
might speculate that the accessibility and retrievability of EMs may 
be particularly vulnerable to interference as a result of fluctuations 
in emotional states. Evidence for emotional influences on memory 
will therefore be considered. 
Emotional Influences Upon Memory 
The structures and processes of memory have assumed an increa-
ingly important role in theories of human cognition over the last 
decade (Rumelhart & Norman, 1983). Many researchers now accept the 
following propositions about the structure of memories (Tulving & 
Bower, 1974): 
a) memory representations of individual events can be studied 
and described; 
b) memories are usefully conceptualized as collections of more 
elementary components or features; 
c) these features or components differ in some sense quali-
tatively; 
d) they are at least to some extent independently manipulable 
and variable; and 
e) the extent to. which a particular feature is represented 
in a memory trace can be quantitatively assessed. 
Equally recognized is the fact that one's assumptions about memory 
representations cannot be logically separated from assumptions about 
memory processes, the two equally constrain one another (Anderson, 
1978). 
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A powerful method for assessing the contents of memories involves 
retrieval cueing (Tulving & Bower, 1974). Based on the encoding 
specificity principle (Tulving, 1983), the method involves testing 
memory for the same class of events using different retrieval cues. 
If it is assumed that the effectiveness of cues is a function of their 
"match" or inherent similarity with the features encoded in a memory, 
then the relative effectiveness of different cues serves to identify 
the features of a memory. In this way both the structure (i.e., 
features or components) and the process (i.e., the encoding specific-
ity principle) of memory can be examined. 
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A logical consequence of this framework for examining memory has 
been the recognition that various features of the "psychological 
state" of the individual, in addition to the putatively "to-be-
remembered" material, are encoded into memory representations of 
events. One of the more intriguing aspects of this process is illus-
trated by occasions when.it appears that the individual's "state" 
takes precedence over the "to-be-remembered" material as effective 
retrieval cues for memories. Such occasions are termed instances of 
"state-dependent" memory, and alcohol and drugs are known to produce 
such effects (Eich, 1980). 
Recently, Bower (1981, 1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) has re-
viewed an extensive series of investigations he has conducted demon-
strating that emotions can act as distinctive encoding and retrieval 
contexts for memories. He calls this "mood-dependent retrieval" (MDR) 
because it appears to be quite analogous to the phenomena of drug 
and alcohol "state-dependent" memory. 
One of the first studies showing that an individual in a happy 
or sad mood better remembers material learned while in the congruent 
mood is described in Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan (1978). Moods were 
manipulated in this study through the use of hypnotic induction. Each 
subject learned two different word lists and then was asked to recall 
both lists in a third and final session. Mood was manipulated at 
three times: while learning list 1, list 2, and at recall. Six 
different groups were formed by crossing the two moods of happiness 
(H) and sadness (S) with the three stages of the study, i.e., H-H-H, 
H-S-H, H-S-S, S-H-S, S-S-S, and S-H-H. Two types of matching of 
moods across conditions therefore occurred. The mood "controls" who 
learned and recalled the lists in the same mood (H-H-H and S-S-S), 
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and the groups who learned and recalled one of the lists in the same 
mood (H-S-H, H-S-S, S-H-S, and S-H-H). Memory or retention was scored 
as the percentage of items recalled from the original learning trials 
that were retrieved on the last recall test. The results were clear 
cut and highly synnnetric. Figure 1 shows these results. Subjects 
learning and recalling a list in the same mood (either happy or sad) 
demonstrated the highest retention. Subjects in the same mood (either 
happy or sad) across all three sessions (the "mood controls") demon-
strated an intermediate level of retention. Subjects who learned 
and recalled a list in different moods (either happy then sad or sad 
then happy) demonstrated the poorest retention. Thus, an emotional 
state appears to have either facilitated or interferred with recall 
depending upon whether learning and recall occurred under similar or 
different moods. 
The experiment just described involved a learning task in which 
the emotional state of the subject was manipulated at both initial 
encoding and later retrieval. As such it provides the necessary 
degree of experimental control to warrant the conclusion that some-
thing about the emotional state of the subject influenced the accessi-
bility of the learned materials. The possibility that the hypnotic 
80 
70 
% 
Retention 60 
learn 
sad learn happy 
11 
Mood 
Controls 
50 
40 
Sad Happy 
Recall Mood 
Percent retention depending on the match between learning 
and recall moods. The sloping lines refer to subjects 
who learned the two lists under different moods. 
* Figure 1. The "Symmetric" Mood-Dependent-Recall Effect 
*This figure is from Bower (1981, p. 132, Figure 2) 
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procedures somehow influenced the results does not appear likely since 
this two-list learning study has subsequently been replicated with 
similar (though not ~xactly the same) results by Bartlett and San-
trock (1979) using children and a mood manipulation involving the 
reading of happy and sad stories. This experiment and the follow-up 
in Bartlett, Burleson, and Santrock (1982) will be discussed in 
greater detail subsequently when findings of asymmetric MDR effects 
will be considered. 
In addition to word-lists, Bower (1981) reports the accessibil-
ity of recent autobiographical memories can be influenced by 
MDR. Subjects were given diaries in which to record their signifi-
cant emotional experiences for one week. They were asked to describe 
the incident and rate its emotional intensity as soon as possible 
after the event occurred. At the end of the recording week the 
14 subjects turned in their diaries and returned one week later for 
testing. At this time they were placed in either a happy or a sad 
mood and were asked to recall all of the incidents they had recorded. 
MDR was observed: Subjects who were happy at recall retrieved pro-
portionately more of their happy incidents (94%) than did subjects 
who were sad (46%). The MDR effect, however, was "asymmetrical" in 
that the sad subjects did not recall a larger proportion of sad than 
happy memories. Happy subjects on average recalled 25.1 happy and 
1.5 unhappy incidents while sad subjects recalled 8.6 happy incidents 
and 10 unhappy incidents. Thus, in addition to MDR, a difference in 
the effectiveness of memory functioning was observed across the mood 
conditions. Happy subjects recalled a larger total number of memories 
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than did the sad subjects (27 versus 18.6). 
Having subjects rate the affective quality of a life-incident 
at the time of diary recording may have confounded the judgment of 
affective quality with the emotional tone of the experience itself as 
the factor producing the observed MDR effect. In other words, it may 
have been the affective judgment that "matched" the mood of the sub-
ject at recall. To rule out this possibility another study was con-
ducted (Bower, 1981, Experiment 3). In this study subjects were 
asked to recall autobiographical incidents occurring before "entering 
high school" (subjects were college students). The assumption 
underlying this study was that subjects have a store of both happy 
and sad autobiographical memories. If MDR operates then one would 
predict that memories with affective qualities congruent with mood at 
recall would be better remembered than memories with dissimilar 
affective qualities. 
The design of the study involved the use of post-hypnotic 
suggestions (Hilgard, 1965) to the effect that the subjects would 
enter either a happy or sad mood when "cued" by the investigator. Out 
of trance subjects were asked to recall incidents before high school 
and it was emphasized that as many unrelated incidents as possible 
were to be recalled. Subjects wrote brief "telegraphic" single-line 
phrases describing the incidents on a sheet of "green paper" that was 
the post-hypnotic cue for some subjects to feel sad and others happy. 
Ten minutes were allowed for recall. The post-hypnotic suggestion 
was then removed and subjects were asked to return the next day. At 
this time subjects, who were presumably in a more "neutral" mood 
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state, rated the affective quality of each incident as either happy, 
neutral or sad. These ratings were used to look for the MDR effect. 
An analysis of variance on the number of happy versus sad memories 
showed that happy subjects recalled far more happy memories and sad 
subjects recalled slightly more sad memories. The ratio of happy to 
happy plus sad memories was also analyzed. The proportion of happy 
memories would be 50% if no selective mood biasing was present. Happy 
subjects had a "happy proportion" of 96% while sad subjects had a 
"happy proportion" of 46% which is a statistically significant dif-
ference between the groups. The MDR effect was again asymmetric in 
that the sad subjects did not show a higher proportion of sad (i.e., 
sad to happy plus sad) memories than did the happy subjects. 
A final study described in Bower (1981) provides what is 
probably the most impressive evidence of MDR currently available. 
It is also the most complex of the studies reported. The basic 
premise underlying MDR is that moods or affective states can act as 
distinctive encoding and retrieval contexts that either facilitate or 
interfere with memory when they are congruent or incongruent. To 
determine whether multiple emotions rather than just happy and sad 
emotions influence memory, the following study was conducted. The 
issue was whether four emotions could produce different degrees of 
MDR effect depending upon their degree of similarity to one another. 
Using Plutchik's (1980) analysis of basic emotions, Bower selected 
the emotions of joy, sadness, anger, and fear. According to Plutchik 
(1980) these emotions differ in their degree of polarity (or opposite-
ness) and similarity to one another. Joy is the polar opposite- of 
fear. These polar sets of emotions are orthogonal to one another in 
Plutchik's (1980) structural or "circumplex" model of emotions. 
Figure 2 displays Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model of eight basic 
emotions illustrating their similarity and polarity relationships. 
15 
The main prediction of Bower's (1981) study was that a recall 
mood similar to a learning mood would result in greater accessibility 
or recall. To test this subjects were asked to learn a different 
word list in each of the four emotions and then to recall each list 
while either in the same emotional state (in which it was learned), a 
different but not opposite emotional state, or the opposite emotional 
state. The results were that emotional similarity (as indexed by 
Plutchik's model) affected recall. When learning and recall emotions 
matched, retention averaged (i.e., across all four emotion matches) 
85%; when the emotions were different but not opposite, 70% of the 
words on a list were recalled; but when learning and recall emotional 
states were opposite, retention averaged only 54%. The results are 
so orderly that they confirm not only Bower's MDR predictions but also 
lend support to Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling solution for the 
emotions (Bower, 1981). This point will be discussed more fully later 
when Plutchik's model is considered in detail. 
The results of the four studies conducted by Bower indicate that 
emotions can selectively bias the recall of affectively toned memories. 
It should also be noted that these studies comprise only a small pro-
portion of the research he has conducted to determine the influence 
of emotional states upon cognitive processes in general. These other 
influences are not the primary concern of the present study. For the 
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Figure 2. Plutchik's Circumplex Model of Emotions* 
*Adapted from Plutchik (1980, Figure 11.2, page 160). 
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sake of comprehensiveness, however, it can be noted that, in addition 
to MDR, Bower has found evidence that 1) mood states enhance the 
learning of mood congruent material, 2) the intensity of a mood 
affects learning differently depending on the particular mood and 
materials used, and 3) emotional states can bias cognitive processes 
such as interpretations, fantasies, projections, free associations, 
personal forecasts, and social judgments. Research supporting these 
assertions is reviewed in Bower (1981, 1983; Bower & Cohen, 1982; 
Gilligan & Bower, 1984). 
Bower's Theory of Mood-Dependent Recall 
Before turning to other studies finding MDR effects it will be 
useful to consider Bower's (1981; Bower & Cohen, 1982) semantic net-
work theory of affect and memory processes. This theory models 
memory for an event in terms of an associative network of descriptive 
propositions and concepts. Network theories (e.g., Anderson & Bower, 
1973; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Collins & Quillian, 1969; Rumelhart & 
Norman, 1983) conceptualize memory as an associative network of nodes 
representing among other things concepts, schemata, and events. 
Bower (1981) proposed that emotions might be considered as nodes or 
units in such a network with each emotion node having strong associa-
tive links to other units in the network (Figure 3). An event becomes 
encoded in the network as a series of propositions with powerful 
associative links to concepts and other units (such as "emotion 
nodes") and schemata to which they are related. The propositions in 
an associative network can refer to words, autobiographical experi-
ences, stories, or any other type of material encoded into memory. 
Figure 3.a The Associative-Network Connections Which Can 
Be Used to Explain Mood-Dependent Retrieval 
The subject has studied many adjective-noun 
phrases (also called Subjects and Predicates, 
e.g., Dying Dog, Lost Money, etc.) in Context 
1 while feeling Emotion 1. 
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aThis figure is from Gilligan & Bower (1984), p. 556, Figure 18.3. 
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These propositions are conceived as "the basic units of thought, and 
the activation of them or their related concepts is the basic process 
of thought" (Gilligan & Bower, 1984, p. 556). Activation is assumed 
to occur either directly or indirectly. Direct activation occurs 
by the presentation of a corresponding stimulus pattern; for example, 
stimulation of an emotion would activate the corresponding emotion 
node; or, to give another example, presentation of a word would 
activate a corresponding lexical item encoded in the associative 
network. Indirect activation occurs when "energy" spreads (Collins 
& Loftus, 1975) from associated nodes that are activated; for 
example, the lexical item node could be activated by "energy spreading" 
to it from an associated ("linked") emotion node. 
The MDR results can be explained using the concepts of "spread-
ing activation" and an associative network through the use of one 
additional assumption. Specifically, when material (of any kind) is 
encoded into the "network," emotions present at the time are also 
"tagged" into the same portion of the associative network. For 
example, in the list learning study presented earlier, one assumes 
the following. When a word is presented to the subject and encoded 
into memory, the emotional state at the time is also encoded along 
with the word. Facilitative MDR effects at recall are explained by 
assuming that congruent moods provide indirect activation for the node 
representing the word. Inhibitory MDR effects are explained on the 
assumption that the incongruent emotion node sends indirect activa-
tion to portions of the network representing material other than the 
"to-be-remembered" material. This causes "interference" for the 
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decision and control processes that many models of memory assume are 
involved in the act of recall (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Lindsay & Nor-
man, 1977; Wickelgren, 1979). 
An interesting aspect of this account of MDR is its ability to 
explain a previously puzzling feature of state-dependent memory (SDM) 
effects in general (Eich, 1980) such as those created by drugs and 
alcohol. Eich's (1980) review of this literature revealed that the 
many inconsistencies in finding SDM could be resolved when the spe-
cific memory tasks used to assess SDM were considered. He shows that 
the likelihood of finding positive evidence for SDM increases to the 
extent that memory is tested by recall rather than recognition 
methods. The associative network theory of MDR accounts for this 
difference using the concepts of direct and indirect activation. 
Consider for a moment the differences between a recall and recogni-
tion test. A recognition test is conducted by presenting the subject 
with the "to-be-remembered" item and inquiring whether it had or had 
not been presented in the learning trial. In this test, presentation 
of the "to-be-remembered" item provides direct activation for the 
portion of the associative network encoding the memory through the 
presentation of its corresponding stimulus pattern (i.e., a word, 
nonsense syllable, etc.). A SDM recognition test may therefore 
"override" any influence of the mismatch between learning and memory 
test "states" by providing the subject with a retrieval cue that acts 
as a direct source of activation for the memory. 
By contrast an SDM recall test constitutes a much more severe 
test of memory. The recall task does not provide subjects with 
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specific cues (or "direct activation") with which to retrieve the 
memory. In such tests the subject is asked simply to remember what 
had been presented earlier. Under this set of circumstances the 
subject must "self-generate" (Anderson & Bower, 1973; Tulving & Thom-
son, 1973) cues with which to retrieve the memory. These self-
generated cues are by definition sources of indirect activation for 
the associative network since they do not contain the exact stimulus 
pattern which is encoded in it. Thus, in a SDM (or an MDR) recall 
test when the subject's current "state" (either emotional or drug/ 
alcohol induced) matches "features" encoded into the memory, it pro-
vides a source of direct activation for the memory and can facilitate 
retrieval. A "mismatch" between encoding and retrieval "states" 
degrades memory performance in a similar way by activating the wrong 
portions of the network which thus interferes with successful recall. 
A final bit of evidence with which to evaluate this account is 
provided in Gilligan and Bower (1984). This study tested whether MDR 
would be differentially observed using recognition and recall tasks. 
Using hypnotic induction of happy and angry emotional states, the 
subject viewed pictures of faces first in one and then the other mood. 
Following an interval, subjects were given one recognition test in 
one of the moods and then another recognition test in the other mood. 
Each recognition test included "distractor" pictures not previously 
shown, some pictures learned in the happy mood, and some learned in 
the angry mood. This 2 x 2 design ensured that pictures seen in 
congruent and incongruent moods were viewed in each recognition test 
thus testing for MDR effects. The results were negative. No MPR 
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effects could be observed in either recognition test. Thus, Eich's 
(1980) generalization that SDM effects occur in recall but not recog-
nition tests generalizes to emotional "states" and indicates that MDR 
is a similar type of phenomenon. 
A Review of Mood-Dependent Recall Studies 
Table 1 lists the results of 24 experiments on MDR. This table 
includes the 6 independent studies reported by Bower (Bower et al., 
1978; 1981). Table 1 classifies studies by the type of mood-induction 
procedure used (with the exception of two studies which more precisely 
"categorized" subject by diagnostic category), the specific moods or 
emotions studied, and the degree of MDR observed (none, asymmetric, 
symmetric). 
Before hypnotic and non-hypnotic studies can be discussed as a 
group it is necessary to determine whether these different methods of 
manipulating moods affect the results of studies. Of the 18 studies 
not conducted by Bower, 17 did not use hypnosis to alter moods. 
Furthermore, of these 17 studies, 12 (70.6%) found some degree of MDR 
(i.e., either symmetric or asymmetric). Of the 7 studies which did 
utilize hypnosis, 5 or 71.4% found some degree of MDR. Therefore, one 
can conclude that hypnosis is not necessary for MDR to occur and that 
it does not appear to produce a larger proportion of MDR effects across 
studies than does a non-hypnotic method of mood manipulation. 
Subjects. The 24 studies used a variety of subject groups. 
Bartlett and Santrock (1979) studied a group of young children with 
a mean age of 10 years while Bartlett et al. (1982) studied two groups 
of children with mean ages of 4 and 7 years. Both studies found 
Table 1 
Twenty-four Mood-Dependent-Recall (MDR) Studies Classified by Induction Method, Mood(s) Studied, 
and Degree of MDR Found (None, Asymmetric, Symmetric) 
INDUCTION METHOD Mood(s) Symmetric Asymmetric No MDR 
Naturalistica 
Bartlett & Santrock (1979)b H-S x 
Bartlett et al. (1982)b,l H-S x 
Clark et a. (1983)c,m (R-E)r x 
Isen et al. (1978)d,n H-S x 
Macht et al. (1977)c,o 
Experiment 1 F-NF x 
Experiment 2 F-NF x 
Experiment 3 F-NF (X)u 
Nasby & Yando (1982)f 
Experiment 1 H-S x 
Experiment 2 H-S x 
N 
w 
Table 1 (continued) 
INDUCTION METHOD Mood(s) Symmetric Asymmetric No MDR 
Velten Techniqueg 
Leight & Ellis (1981) 
Experiment 2g S-N x 
Synder & White (1982)g 
Experiment 1 H-S x 
Experiment 2 H-S x 
Teasdale & Russell (1983)h H-S x 
Teasdale & Taylor (1981)g H-S x 
Teasdale et al. (1978)g H-S x 
Hx:pnosisi 
Bower, Monteiro,& Gilligan (1978)i 
Experiment 1 H-S x 
Experiment 2 H-S x 
Experiment 3 H-S x 
Bower (198l)i,p 
Experiment 2 H-S x 
Experiment 3q H-S x 
Experiment 4 H-S,F-A x 
Natale & Hantas (1982)i,s H-S x N ~ 
Table 1 (continued) 
INDUCTION METHOD Mood(s) Symmetric 
Pathological States 
Clark & Teasdale (1982)j D-D x 
Henry et al. (1973)k M-D x 
NOTES. aThe specific methods for each study in this group are: 
breading happy and sad stories; 
Cphysical exercise; 
dsuccess/failure at a computer game; 
emild electric shock; 
frecalling recent happy and sad autobiographical experiences; 
Asymmetric No MDR 
gdescribed fully in Velten (1968), basically an autosuggestive procedure in which subject reads a series 
of statements printed on index cards that described emotionally-toned attitudes, feelings, behaviors,etc.; 
hused a modified form of Velten's (1968) technique but deleted all references to what might be construed 
by subjects as personal experiences referring to autobiographical events; 
ithe hypnotic induction procedures were standardized insofar as the hypnotist made suggestions about the 
specific feelings the subject was to experience; however, the subject was encouraged to remember auto-
biographical experiences similar to what was suggested and was encouraged to "re-experience" the effect 
that occurred in the past personal experience; 
jthe subjects were clinically diagnosed unipolar depressives showing diurnal variation in intensity of 
depression; 
kthe subjects were diagnosed bipolar affective disorders with episodes of depression and mania ("euphoria"); 
lthe results of Experiment 1 were discarded by the authors due to a procedural error identified through 
Experiment 2 (which is included in this table); 
N 
V1 
Table 1 (continued) 
mExperiment 1 only; 2 and 3 were on "arousal-selective" judgment not memory per se; 
nExperiment 2 is tablulated; Experiment 1 studied mood effects on social behavior; 
oauthors report sex differences. Males displayed synnnetric MDR across all three studies; females 
showed asynnnetric MDR only in Experiments 1 and 2. The group results are tabulated; 
PExperiment 1 in Bower (1981) is summarized from Bower et al. (1978) Experiment 3 so it is included in 
the table from the original article where procedural details may be obtained; 
qthe results showed a statistical trend toward synnnetric MDR but did not reach alpha = .05; 
rthis study compared a "relaxed" (R) to an "exercise" (E) "state" condition; the parentheses are used 
to indicate that presumably two levels of "autonomic arousal" rather than mood states per se were 
compared; 
Sa combined Velten-type and a hypnotic procedure was used to induce mood states in this study; 
tthe mood listed for this study is "F" for fear on the assumption that this was the predominant emotion 
elicited by the author's use of mild electric shock to alter the subject's "state"; 
UMDR was observed for items early in the list though results for the entire list were insignificant (see 
text for a discussion of this finding); 
VH happy; S = sad; R = "relaxed"; E = "exercise"; F = fear; NF = no fear; A = anger; D = depression; 
M =mania (euphoria). 
asymmetric MDR. The studies by Clark and Teasdale (1982) and Henry, 
Weingartner, and Murphy (1973) studied adults with diagnoses of uni-
polar major affective disorder and bipolar major affective disorder 
(experiencing episodes both mania and depression) which had mean ages 
of 43 and 44 years, respectively. All other studies in Table 1 used 
young, adult, college students. All age groups showed some degree of 
MDR. Therefore, age does not appear to be a major determining factor 
of MDR. 
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The diagnostic groups studied both produced symmetrical MDR 
only. All other groups studied produced more variable results. 
However, there are only two studies using clinical groups, and future 
studies with such groups may produce more variable degrees of MDR. In 
any case it is not likely that the presence of psychopathology per se 
accounts for the consistency across these two studies. The nature of 
the psychopathology across the two groups is quite different on a 
whole spectrum of dimensions: i.e., symptomatology (both experience 
depression but only one by diagnostic criteria can ~ have exper-
ienced episodes of mania), presumed psychological and biological eti-
ologies, response to biological and psychological treatment (one group 
generally responds to "antidepressant medications" while the other 
generally responds to an entirely different medication type; that is, 
lithium), and the life-course prognosis of the disorder (one generally 
decreases in severity with age while the other generally does not). 
What probably is common across the two clinical groups is the "inten-
sity" of the emotional or mood states they experience. Of all sub-
jects studied in Table 1, the clinical groups probably experienced 
the most intense levels of "sadness" (depression) and in the case of 
the bipolar group, "happiness" (more precisely, "euphoria"). The 
variable of emotion intensity will be considered again after other 
differences between the studies have been evaluated. 
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Materials. A variety of materials have been used to examine 
memory across the MDR studies: single or double word-lists, word-
associations, simple phrases, stories, personality trait terms (pos-
itive, negative, and neutral in connotation), and autobiographical 
memories. MDR effects have been found with each type of variable 
though each has not always shown an MDR effect. Specifically, Bower 
et al. (1978) in Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find MDR with single 
word-lists but did find MDR when two word-lists were used. The 
authors argued that the single-word lists make for a "ceiling effect" 
that masked any MDR that might have been observed. However, Leight 
and Ellis (1981) used a single word-list and found asymmetric MDR. 
Thus, it does not seem likely that either subject characteris-
tics or material type can be considered independent causes of MDR 
variability in this set of studies. 
Mood-manipulation methods. Four different methods of controlling 
for mood variation in MDR studies have been used: 1) hypnosis; 2) an 
"autosuggestive" procedure designed by Velten (1968) that requires the 
subject to read a series of mood-relevant statements that the subject 
is to "imagine" as being true for him or herself; 3) a variety of 
more "naturalistic" methods such as mild shock, reading happy and 
sad stories, remembering happy and sad recent autobiographical exper-
iences, and success/failure at a computer game (see Table 1 notes for 
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the complete list and the studies which used them); and 4) classi-
fication of subjects by endogenously-produced mood states (i.e., the 
two clinical groups, see Table 1). Each method of mood "manipulation" 
has produced some degree of MDR. 
Moods studied. A variety of moods or emotions have been com-
pared in MDR studies. The vast majority of studies (71%) have com-
pared "happy" and "sad" moods, though fear, anger, "relaxation," and 
"exercise" conditions have also been studied. Clark, Milberg, and 
Ross (1983) argued that variations in "autonomic arousal" per se are 
sufficient to produce MDR. They found evidence for their assertion 
when they compared a "relaxation" to an "exercise" condition. How-
ever, the authors did not actually measure the "emotional states" or 
"arousal levels" of their subjects. Mandler (1984) has argued that 
autonomic arousal is a non-specific component of emotional states 
that is "interpreted" in terms of the thoughts and environmental 
events covarying with it. He suggests arousal amplifies cognitive 
"appraisals" into "emotional states." If this is the case we may 
assume Clark et al. 's (1983) subjects did experience emotions. We 
simply do not know what these emotions were. 
Anger was studied in combination with fear, joy, and sadness 
in Bower's (1981) Experiment 4 presented in detail earlier. The 
reliable and very systematic effects observed indicated that distinct 
emotions were produced and the polarity/similarity relations between 
them affected memory. 
Fear was studied in a much less precise way in the Macht, Spear, 
and Levis (1977) study where mild shocks were used. The authors 
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recognized that some type of anxiety was produced through this method, 
but they did not systematically assess it in Experiment 1 or 3. When 
Experiment 1 produced symmetric MDR the authors wanted to be sure that 
it could be attributed to the anxiety produced by shock. They 
attempted to measure anxiety in Experiment 2 with galvanic skin re-
sponse (GSR). Apparently, however, the introduction of GSR measure-
ments (the sole change across studies 1-3) was sufficient to alter the 
conditions producing MDR because none was initially observed in Exper-
iment 2. Experiment 3 (without GSR measurements) was conducted to 
verify the results of Experiment 1. Upon initial analysis Experiment 
3 revealed no MDR. When the results of the three studies were re-
analyzed by sex of subject, males were found to produce MDR across 
all three experiemnts, but females did so only in Experiments 1 and 3. 
A further analysis tested whether a "serial-position" effect could be 
observed such that items learned early in list learning trials were 
affected by MDR. This showed both males and females exhibited MDR 
in Experiments 1 and 3, but only males did so in Experiment 2. 
The complex results of Macht et al. (1977) may be artifactual. 
However, Polivy (1981) reports data indicating threat of shock pro-
duces emotions, though the resulting emotional "state" is more proper-
ly considered a "blend" of fear, anger, and sadness rather than just 
fear alone. If we can generalize from a "threat of shock" to an 
actual mild shock condition then Polivy's (1981) results may help 
explain the Macht et al. (1977) findings. Polivy (1981) found that 
shock threat not only produces reliable increases in three emotions, 
but as well, the three emotions show rapid temporal fluctuations in 
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their respective intensities. Sadness rapidly decreases (over 5-10 
minutes) while anger increases (same time period). Thus, the "serial 
position" effect of Macht et al. (1977) may reflect this waxing and 
waning of different emotions; and, of course, it is the presence of 
such emotions which is assumed to produce MDR. Finally, Polivy 
(1981) reports a reliable three-way interaction between sex of sub-
ject, sex of investigator, and time period (from the moment of shock 
threat) on the intensities of the three emotions elicited by this 
method of mood manipulation. Her results (Polivy, 1981) indicate that 
female investigators induce more fear; and over time the tendency to 
become more fearful with an investigator of the opposite sex (i.e., 
subsequently both sexes show a sex of investigator X sex of subject 
interaction) increases especially in "high threat" conditions. Thus, 
the "state" of the subject over the entire 5-10 minute learning per-
iods used by Macht et al. (1977) may, indeed, have been very different 
when the specific emotions involved are considered. Polivy's study 
suggests that much greater attention must be paid to emotion-speci-
fici ty and temporal fluctuations in emotions in MDR studies. 
Polarity. A final consideration regarding the moods studied in 
the MDR experiments is their "polarity." Eighteen of the studies 
compared the polar effects of joy and sadness. Clark et al. (1983) 
compared a "relaxed" to an "exercise" condition, but this, too, would 
conceivably meet the criteria of "polar" states in the broadest sense. 
However, five other studies did not compare polar states in any sense 
of this term. Clark and Teasdale (1982) compared the effects of 
variations in the intensity of depression. Macht et al. (1977) 
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compared the effects of consistent shock (shock-shock condition) with 
variable shock or no shock at all in three experiments. Finally, 
Leight and Ellis (1981) compared induced sadness to a "neutral mood 
state" condition. Of these five studies the latter four seem 
problematic. 
This is clearer if three conunon assumptions about affective 
"states" (as opposed to other types of "states" produced through 
exogenous substances such as alcohol or drugs) are considered. The 
first assumption is that some type of emotion is always present in 
subjects. The second is that emotions are continuously variable 
quantities (i.e., have a real underlying dimension of "intensity"). 
And the third is that certain emotional states are opposites or 
polarized in some sense (Izard, 1971; Plutchik, 1980; Tompkins, 1962, 
1963; Wessman & Ricks, 1966). This suggests that comparing an induced 
emotional state to an unmanipulated neutral one is more a conceptual 
exercise than an empirical one. Subjects categorized as "neutral" 
probably are experiencing some type and degree of affect. We simply 
do not know what it might be. Of course, this criticism does not 
apply when investigator measures the state of the subjects and sets a 
criterion for the categorization of subjects as neutral. In the 
latter case we have some empirical referent for the presumed neutral 
emotional state. 
These considerations make it difficult to interpret the results 
of the sad versus "neutral" comparison by Leight and Ellis (1981) and 
the Macht et al. (1977) shock, variable shock, and no shock conditions. 
Since two of the four experiments (see Table 1) showed some degree of 
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MDR this presents a real dilemma. The variable results across all 24 
MDR experiments must be attributed to either real variability in the 
phenomena or to improper experimental control over the key parameters 
of the process by the investigator. In the case of the studies by 
Leight and Ellis (1981) and Macht et al. (1977) the latter appears 
more likely to have been the case. In subsequent analyses of the 
entire 24 studies, then the results of these four experiments will not 
be considered. The data from Polivy (1981) supports my rejection of 
the Macht et al. (1977) series; and, the conceptual analysis given 
to comparisons of an "emotional" to a "neutral" state is the basis for 
rejecting the Leight and Ellis (1981) asymmetric MDR result. In 
effect, this eliminates two positive and two negative MDR results 
across two types of induction conditions (shock and Velten induction). 
Emotional intensity. Several authors have speculated that the 
intensity of emotional states may be a parameter influencing MDR 
studies. For example, Clark et al. (1983) argue variations in "auto-
nomic arousal" may produce MDR. In a somewhat different vein Macht 
et al. (1977) and Nashy and Yando (1982, footnote 2) argue asymmetric 
MDR may be due to the failure to induce sufficiently intense emotional 
states. Finally, Teasdale and Taylor (1981) present evidence that 
differences in the accessibility of memories between mood conditions 
(i.e., happy and sad) correlate with the extent to which the moods 
actually differed between the conditions. The correlations between 
happy and sad moods and the rated intensity (by subject) of happy 
and sad memories were statistically significant. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare directly and 
, , 
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objectively MDR studies in terms of emotional intensity. Only four 
studies used standardized measures of mood states (specifically, the 
studies by Teasdale and his colleagues, see Table 1). Indeed, some 
investigators did not even measure mood changes at all but simply 
assumed that they changed as a result of mood manipulations (e.g., 
Bower et al., 1978, Experiments 1-3; Bower [1981], Experiment 4; !sen 
et al. [1978], Experiment 2; Macht et al. [1977], Experiments 1 and 
3). In future studies this could easily be corrected since several 
standardized mood assessment devices are available (Lorr & McNair, 
1982; Lubin, 1967; Underwood & Froming, 1980; Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965). 
Lacking objective criteria for mood intensities across studies, 
a more intuitively based comparison can be made. One would expect the 
unipolar major depressives and the bipolar major depressives to be 
experiencing the most intense emotional states. A more moderate degree 
of emotional intensity may be attributed to those subjects who under-
went hypnotic and Velten (1968) type mood inductions. These two pro-
cedures actually have three striking similarities. First, both pro-
cedures involve the use of "suggestions" (i.e., in hypnosis it is 
given by investigator; in Velten's procedure they are given one at a 
time on index cards). Second, both procedures involve the selective 
focusing of attention upon the specific suggestions (i.e., the hypno-
tist acts as the "focuser" in one procedure while the index cards 
produce the same or similar effect in the other). And three, both 
procedures request subjects to engage in an "imaginative involvement" 
with the suggestions. The primary difference between the procedures 
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is that one is basically interpersonal (hypnosis) while the other 
occurs in a more individualistic context. Previous hypnosis research 
suggests that many of the effects of hypnosis may be obtained either 
through "autosuggestive" or more interpersonal procedures (Fronnn, 
Brown, Hurt, Oberlander, Boxer, & Pfiefer, 1981). Therefore, it is 
probably legitimate to assume that both hypnosis and the Velten-type 
inductions produced similar (moderate) intensities of emotional 
states in subjects. 
The least intense emotional states can probably be attributed 
to the more "naturalistic" mood inductions. Success/failure at a 
computer game, reading happy and sad stories, physical exercise, and 
simply recalling happy and sad recent autobiographical events intui-
tively uould seem to produce less intense emotions than would an 
"autosuggestive" (Velten technique) or hypnotic mood induction. Thus, 
we can rank the different induction methods from most to least "in-
tensive" as: clinical groups, the hypnotic and Velten procedures, 
and the "naturalistic" ones. The only exception to this ranking may 
be the Macht et al. (1977) shock inductions. This method, despite 
being classified as "naturalistic" in Table 1, would probably belong 
in the group of studies inducing "moderately" intense emotions (i.e., 
the hypnotic and Velten methods). However, as previously discussed, 
this study and the one by Leight and Ellis (1981) have already been 
excluded from subsequent analyses. One can note, however, that 
inclusion of both of these reports would not substantially alter the 
results which emerge from the present analysis. 
When Table 1 is examined with the current classification of 
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presumed emotional intensities in mind, a trend can be observed. The 
"less intense" induction methods produced more variable MDR results 
than did the more "moderate" and "high" intensity methods of manipu-
lating subjects' moods. Table 2 presents the proportion of studies 
in the "high, moderate, and low intensity groups" finding each degree 
of MDR (none, asynunetric, and synunetric). The results are very order-
ly. Studies using subjects presumed to be experiencing more moder-
ately or highly intense emotional states also produced the largest 
proportion of MDR results (either synunetric or asynunetric) and the 
smallest proportions of failures to observe MDR. Table 2 also shows 
that the proportions would not change substantially if the Leight and 
Ellis (1981) and Macht et al. (1977) experiments were included (see 
Table 2, note a), 
It should be noted that the number of studies in the "high in-
tensity" row is only two. The proportions may change as more MDR 
studies are conducted with diagnosed clinical groups. However, when 
only the "low" and "moderate" intensity groups are compared, the 
differences between them are still apparent. Therefore, it remains 
possible that differences in the intensity of the emotional states 
across studies accounts for the variability in degree of MDR observed. 
The blending of emotions in mood states. A second possibility 
that may account for the variability across studies is the presence 
of multiple emotions in both naturalistically occurring (Izard, 1972, 
1977; Plutchik, 1980; Tompkins, 1962, 1963) and induced (Polivy, 1981) 
affective states. Emotion theorists have long argued that emotions 
rarely occur in isolation; rather, they tend to occur in 
Table 2 
proportion of Studies Finding Synnnetric, Asynnnetric, and No Mood-
-
E_ependent Recall as a Function of Intensity of Emotional States 
presumed to Result from Different Induction Proceduresa 
Degree of Mood Dependent Recall 
Mood-Intensity Symmetric Asymmetric None 
Low (N = 5) 16.6% 33.3% 50% 
Moderate (~ = 12) 58.3% 25% 16.6% 
High (N = 2) 100% 0% 0% 
Note. aThe mood-induction methods were ranked from low-moderate-
high. All studies in the "Naturalistic" section of Table 1 
except Macht et al. (1977) are included in the "low inten-
sity group." All studies from the "Hypnotic" and "Velten 
Technique" sections of Table 1 are included in the "moder-
ate intensity group" except Leight and Ellis (1981). The 
two studies in the "Pathological States" section of Table 1 
comprise the "high intensity group." If the two excluded 
studies are incorporated into the "moderate intensity 
group" the proportions for this row become: symmetric = 
to%; asymmetric = 25%; and no effect = 25%. 
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"combinations" (Izard, 1972, 1977) or "blends" (Plutchik, 1980). 
Plutchik (1980) argues, for example, that "contempt" consists of the 
blending of the two more "basic" emotions of anger and disgust. 
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The blending of emotions in affective states may be particularly 
important when moods are induced. Polivy (1981) has shown that a 
variety of mood-induction methods produce multiple emotions even when 
the inductions were intended to produce only one emotional state. 
This appears to be especially true when negative or sad emotional 
states are induced. She presents data showing that inductions in-
tended to increase only sadness also increased anger and hostility. 
In one study (Experiment 3a) an induction to increase depression 
actually increased the intercorrelation of anxiety, depression, and 
hostility to an average E. = .88. 
The careful examination of multiple emotions reported in Teas-
dale's (Teasdale et al., 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) MDR research 
verifies the relevance of Polivy's (1981) findings. Teasdale used 
Velten's (1968) procedure to induce elation and depression. Subjects 
rated their mood states after each induction on 0-100 point scales 
for despondency, anxiety, and happiness. Each induction produced 
statistically significant differences on each of the affect scales. 
The exact scores were: elation condition (despondency = 8.5; anxiety 
= 18.5; happiness= 71.7); depression condition (despondency= 44.8; 
anxiety= 28.5; happiness= 37.0). The depression condition appears 
to produce a more "mixed" affective state than the elation condition. 
This was also observed in Teasdale and Taylor (1981) even though the 
Velten-type induction was modified to eliminate any reference to the 
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subject's life experiences (to avoid "cueing" affective autobiograph-
ical memories which was the dependent measure in the research). Using 
the same three affective scales the scores were: elation condition 
(despondency= 13.1; anxiety= 18.4; happiness= 62.9); depression 
condition (despondency= 48.4; anxiety= 21; happiness= 29.8). Thus, 
not only are multiple affects induced by inductions targeted at only 
one emotion, but the "depression" inductions also produce more "mixed" 
affective states than do "elation" inductions. 
This is relevant to the data in Table 2. There are 5 studies 
(Bartlett & Santrock, 1979; Bartlett et al., 1982, Bower, 1981, Exper-
iment 2 and 3; Natale & Hantas, 1982) that compared the effects of 
happy/sad moods on memory and also obtained asymmetric MDR results. 
Ineachof these studies the sad emotional state failed to influence 
memory to the degree the happy state did, i.e., was the cause of the 
asymmetric pattern of MDR results. The studies by Bower (1981) and 
Natale and Hantas (1982) used happy and sad autobiographical memories 
as the dependent variable while the studies by Bartlett (Bartlett & 
Santrock, 1979; Bartlett et al., 1982) used word lists. Since the 
studies use different induction procedures and different types of 
recollections, the asymmetric MDR observed may be due to the greater 
mixture of emotions produced by depression inductions. 
If emotion intensity and the blending of emotions is influencing 
the results of MDR studies, then it would be useful to have a model of 
affective states which addresses these two aspects of emotions. Plut-
chik (1980) argues that three parameters of emotions, i.e., intensity, 
polarity, and similarity, are sufficient to differentiate between 
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discrete emotions in overall affective states. Figure 4 presents 
Plutchik's (1980) model of the interaction between the three parame-
ters of emotions. The idea captured by this figure is that emotions 
become less distinctive at lower intensities. As intensity decreases, 
emotions become more similar (decreasing circumference) and less 
polarized (decreasing diameter). The opposite occurs with increasing 
emotional intensity. Thus, emotional intensity modulates the degree 
of blending (or similarity and polarity) between emotions in affective 
states. 
Teasdale's (Teasdale et al., 1980; Teasdale & Taylor, 1981) data, 
presented earlier, support this conceptualization. When the "despon-
dency" and "happiness" values changed across the studies so, too, did 
the values for the other emotions measured. 
Figure 4 presents the relations between emotions at a single 
point in time. The argument just made, however, draws explicitly upon 
the temporal dimension of emotional states, e.g., polar emotions at 
high intensities are not likely to be experienced at the same time. 
Thus, a fourth temporal dimension is required to more completely 
understand the relations between emotions in mood states. Recent 
empirical work highlights this clearly. 
Diener and Emmons (1985; Diener, Larsen, Levine, & Emmons, 
1985) have shown that intensity and polarity are, indeed, independent 
parameters of emotional states that temporally interact in the over-
all affective experience of individuals. Diener and Emmons (1985, 
Experiment 4) had subjects complete three-week, daily, and "moment" 
(i.e., at the moment of the experience) reports of happy and sad 
Figure 4.a Plutchik's Circumplex Model Incorporating 
the Intensity Dimension of Emotions 
41 
r:: 
0 
·~ 
µ 
0 
13 
CJ) 
r:: 
·~ 
tll 
t'd 
CJ) 
i... 
CJ 
r:: 
H 
aThis figure is adapted from Plutchik (1980, p. 113, Figure 11.3). 
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emotions. The principal finding was that the relations between joy 
and sadness differed greatly depending on the time frame considered. 
The strongest negative correlation (i.e., polarity) between the two 
affects occurred during strongly emotional (i.e., high intensity) 
times as measured in the "moment" reports. The negative correlation, 
however, decreased in a linear fashion as the time span covered in-
creased logarithmically. They also presented evidence that polarity 
and intensity are empirically separable dimensions of affect. When 
the intensity of emotions was evaluated they found systematic individ-
ual differences between subjects. Individuals were quite consistent 
across both emotions (happy versus sad) in terms of how intensely 
they reported experiencing the emotions. Some subjects report high 
intensities for both sadness and joy (experienced at different times), 
while others would very seldomly report experiencing high intensity 
levels of either emotion. Thus, when joy and sadness are measured 
systematically (i.e., daily) over time, the relationships between 
their temporal occurrence and their intensity and polarity can be 
generalized as follows. Duration and intensity are inversely corre-
lated aspects of emotional experience, while intensity and polarity 
are positively correlated aspects of emotional experience. The first 
relation occurs because typically strong emotions do not last very 
long and hence will not be present across several measurement periods. 
The second relation occurs because, at any given time period, when 
happiness is experienced intensely, sadness will not be measured as 
present. Thus, these authors provide evidence for the way in which 
intensity and polarity are conceptualized in Figure 4. 
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In light of Bower's (1981, Experiment 4) demonstration that 
Plutchik's (1980) similarity relations between emotions can accurately 
predict differential MDR across emotions, it would be useful to see if 
the intensity and polarity relations could be useful as well. Spe-
cifically, will the circumplex model be useful in understanding sym-
metric versus asymmetric MDR? One would expect that several emotions 
would show more blending when they occur at lower intensities. This 
blending of emotions might, therefore, result in a poorer "match" 
across encoding and retrieval periods because many situational factors 
may slightly alter the "blend" present within the overall affective 
state of the subject. This would be especially likely to occur when 
subjects at low intensities of emotion are used in MDR experiments. 
The following might, therefore, be expected. 
When two polar emotions such as joy and sadness are used in an 
MDR experiment only subjects at the more extreme ranges of emotional 
intensity (on each emotion) will show synnnetric MDR. This follows 
from the assumption that low and moderate emotion intensity subjects 
will be experiencing more "blending" of different emotions in their 
overall affective state. In addition, since the situational and cog-
nitive events determining which emotions will be "blending" are largely 
outside the control of the investigator, as a general prediction, 
asymmetric MDR or no MDR would be expected from subjects experiencing 
moderate and low levels of emotion intensity. The "encoding specific-
ity principle" makes it possible, in principle at least, to make more 
exact predictions for each subject at all levels of emotion intensity. 
However, to empirically realize this possibility will require a degree 
of experimental control over emotional states in subjects that has 
at the present time not yet been demonstrated as feasible. 
A second prediction can be made from Plutchik's (1980) model 
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that involves all eight emotions. If we assume that memories of events 
encode all of the "features" of an experience (or psychological 
"state"), then it follows that memories will encode the combination of 
emotions present at the time of encoding. This suggests one could 
examine the affective contents of autobiographical memories to deter-
mine whether the similarity-polarity features of the circumplex model 
can be identified. 
Wynne and Schiffman (1965) developed an emotion coding manual 
for EMs that was subsequently refined by Plutchik and Wynne (1974). 
This manual can be used to code the presence of all eight of the 
emotions illustrated in Figure 4. 
One might, therefore, expect that when the emotions of joy, sad-
ness, fear, anger, disgust, acceptance, surprise and expectancy are 
coded in EMs, a circumplex pattern will be observed between the emo-
tions. This possibility warrants the following considerations. Plut-
chik (1980) has argued that the particular "pattern" to be observed 
between the eight emotions depends critically on the intensity level 
of emotions being studied. In addition, the particular measure of 
similarity used has also to some extent altered the pattern he has 
found in his own studies. Therefore, " ••• any one study of intensity 
of the primary emotions will provide only an approximation to the 
structure" (Plutchik, 1980, p. 159). Emotions at moderate to high 
levels of intensity are required to observe the circumplex pattern in 
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Figure 2. 
Memories encoding emotions at sufficiently high levels of inten-
sity would, therefore, be required to produce a circumplex pattern. 
Since simply coding the presence and intensity of eight emotions in 
EMs presents a considerable challenge (primarily in terms of relia-
bility and validity), one would not expect to find "perfect" circum-
plexity. However, if some degree of circumplexity can be observed 
between the emotions, then this can be taken as evidence in support of 
the validity and usefulness of Plutchik's (1980) model for understand-
ing MDR variability. 
The next section of this report will present these ideas in a 
more formal fashion as hypotheses. A method of circumplex analysis 
will then be discussed, since it will be used to test for the presence 
of circumplexity between emotions in EMs. 
CHAPTER II 
HYPOTHESES AND THE METHOD OF CIRCUMPLEX ANALYSIS 
The present chapter presents the hypotheses to be tested and the 
method and logic of circumplex analysis to be used in evaluating 
several of the hypotheses. 
Hypotheses 
Three issues will be considered: (1) The effects of mood states 
upon recall, (2) the relations among different emotions encoded in EMs, 
and (3) the influence of current emotional states and emotions in EMs 
upon the frequency of "screen memories." 
Emotional influences upon memory. With regard to MDR, Hypoth-
esis 1 states subjects experiencing a happy mood at recall will 
retrieve more happy EMs than will sad subjects. Hypothesis 2 states 
subjects who are sad at recall will retrieve more sad EMs than will 
happy subjects. Hypothesis 3 states subjects who are sad will recall 
more sad EMs than happy EMs. And Hypothesis 4 states happy subjects 
will retrieve more happy EMs than sad EMs. These hypotheses predict 
symmetric MDR irrespective of the intensity level of a subject's 
mood state. The alternative prediction, based on the assumption that 
mood intensity is non-linearly related to the degree of MDR, can be 
stated as Hypothesis 5: Only subjects experiencing more extreme 
levels of happy and sad moods will show symmetric MDR, more moderate 
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mood subjects will show either asymmetric or no MDR. 
The relations among different emotions encoded in memories. 
Hypothesis 6 states that the 8 basic emotions of fear, anger, joy, 
sadness, disgust, acceptance, expectancy, and surprise will be identi-
fiable in EMs and that they will show correlational relationships 
conforming to the circumplex model (Plutchik, 1980). This hypothesis 
will be tested 6 times, i.e., in five separate EMs and in a "summed" 
EM (a composite score summed across the five EMs). 
Emotions and the "survey characteristics" of EMs. Several 
exploratory questions will be considered with regard to the structural 
features of EMs. First, are there sex differences in the reported 
quality of EMs? And second, do the qualities of EMs show any relation 
to either current emotional states or to emotions rated in EM content? 
Of particular interest will be whether "screen memories" show a rela-
tionship to current emotions or to emotions encoded in EMs. Finally, 
since the features of EMs to be examined are closely related to those 
studied by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982), a comparison across 
the two independent samples will be made. This should reveal the 
extent to which college age subjects show similarities in the basic 
structural features of EMs. 
The Logic and Method of Circumplex Analysis 
The method of circumplex analysis as described by Guttman (1966), 
Steiger (1979), and Wiggins, Steiger and Gaelic (1981) is actually 
a very general structural modeling procedure. The method is structur-
al in that it results in a specification of the relationship between 
each variable in an analysis; the method is general because different 
types of relations can be hypothesized and tested with the method. 
The present discussion draws upon the method articulated by Wiggins 
et al. (1981). 
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The term "circumplex analysis" derives from Guttman's (1966) 
recognition that the varying magnitude of correlation between vari-
ables can be graphically portrayed in terms of a circle. Variables 
more highly correlated are placed closer to one another while variables 
with lower correlations are placed further apart around the circum-
ference of a circle. The resulting display illustrates the ordering 
among a set of variables in terms of magnitude of correlation. Nega-
tive and zero-order correlations can occur. This is especially true 
for interpersonal and emotional variables (Plutchik, 1980; Wiggins 
et al., 1981). When negative correlations occur, this relationship 
between variables is called one of polarity or bipolarity. This is 
illustrated diagramatically by placing polar opposites at the two ends 
of a diameter through the circle. 
While the results of a circumplex analysis are displayed in the 
form of a circle, the method of detecting circumplexity involves the 
identification of a specific pattern in correlation matrices 
(Steiger, 1979; Wiggins et al., 1981). The pattern sought in a matrix 
of variables assumed to have circumplexity can be illustrated with 
Table 3. This table refers to a matrix of eight variables only and 
this applies to the following discussion as well. The letter "p" is 
used to represent the greek letter rho since the table refers to the 
population parameters of variables exhibiting circumplexity. It can 
be seen that each minor diagonal in the table is associated with a 
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Table 3 
Representation of the Circumplex Pattern in a Correlation Matrix1 
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 1 pl > p2 > p3 > p4 
2 pl 1 
3 p2 pl 1 
4 p3 p2 pl 1 
5 P4 p3 p2 pl 1 
6 P3 P4 P3 p2 pl 1 
7 p2 p3 P4 p3 p2 pl 1 
8 pl Pz p3 p4 p3 p2 pl 1 
NOTE: The letter "p" is used to represent the greek symbol for 
the letter rho, the population correlation coefficient. 
1 Adapted from Wiggins, Steiger, and Gaelic (1981, Table 1, p. 267). 
different rho value. The table also states that the rho's (1-4) 
conform to the inequality rho 1 > rho 2 > rho 3 > rho 4. Whenever 
this inequality holds the matrix has "circular" properties. Rho 1 
refers to variables adjacent to one another, rho 2 to variables 
separated by one other variable, rho 3 to variables separated by two 
other variables, and rho 4 to variables separated by three others. 
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In an 8 x 8 matrix of variables assumed to have bipolarity, the in-
equality pattern between rho's takes on one additional characteristic. 
Rho 1 is a positive correlation. Rho 2 is a zero-order correlation. 
Rho 3 is a negative correlation. And rho 4 is a negative correlation 
of even larger magnitude. This follows from the geometric pattern 
that 8 variables can have around a circle. Rho 4 variables are 180 
degrees apart, rho 3 variables are 120 degrees apart, rho 2 variables 
are 90 degrees apart, and rho 1 variables are 45 degrees apart. This 
can be seen in Figure 2 of Plutchik's (1980) circumplex of 8 emotions. 
Initial evaluation of circumplexity is done by obtaining an 
estimate of the rho values and determining whether the inequality 
pattern holds. In addition, however, the magnitude of the rho's 
reflect the magnitude of the principal components, or "latent struc-
tures," presumed to underly the empirical correlations (Wiggins et al., 
1981). In a matrix of "perfectly" circumplex variables, only five 
types of principal components can be extracted (Wiggins et al., 1981). 
These are circumplex, polarity, orthogonality, specificity, and 
general components. The specificity and general components are each 
based upon a single latent vector associated with a single latent 
root. The other three components each have two latent vectors and 
roots. Of these five types all but the circumplexity component 
reflect deviations from perfect circumplexity. Thus, the magnitude 
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of the rho's indicate the amount of empirical variation that can be 
attributed to each type of principal component. Obviously, the more 
variation "captured" by the circumplexity component, the more adequate 
will be one's "circumplex model." 
Variance attributable to each type of principal component can 
be interpreted in a rather straightforward fashion except for the 
general and specificity components. A portion of the variance of the 
rho's can be attributed directly to circumplexity. Variance attribut-
able to the polarity and orthogonality principal components reflect 
deviations from perfect polarity and orthogonality. Thus, the latter 
components measure the variance which cannot be attributed to cir-
cumplexity. The general and specificity components are much more 
difficult to interpret especially when an analysis is conducted 
upon the rho's. In general, they reflect variation due to the 
specific methods and variables used in an analysis (Wiggins et al., 
1981). The variation of interest, of course, is that attributable 
to circumplexity. Since the present study is not concerned with 
refining the circumplex model tested (which is when the orthogonality, 
polarity, general, and specificity components assume more importance), 
only the variation due to circumplexity will be of major concern. 
There are several methods for estimating the rho-values; 
each differs in computational complexity and parametric distributional 
characteristics (Wiggins et al., 1981). The latter affects the 
validity of the statistical goodness-of-fit tests that can be 
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performed upon them. Generalized least square (GLS) estimates of the 
rho's, however, appear to be the best compromise choice, and this 
method will be used here. 
Once the rho's have been computed and inspected for the in-
equality pattern, several further procedures can be used to assess 
the adequacy of a circumplex in modeling the empirical data. Two 
main issues guide this analysis. First, the degree of circumplexity 
observed; and second, the proportion of empirical variance accounted 
for by the principal components underlying the matrix. 
Unfortunately, there is no simple and fully adequate method of 
answering the first issue. Wiggins et al. (1981) suggest the 
following five procedures. First, estimate the rho's to determine 
whether a circular ordering can be used to represent the magnitude 
of correlation between variables. Second, if the inequality of the 
rho's is present, then perform a chi-square test to assess the 
correspondence between the empirical and rho-matrix (i.e., construct 
a matrix with the rho estimates inserted into the positions outlined 
in Table 3). Third, perform a principal components analysis upon 
either or both the empirical and rho-matrices. The latter should be 
equivalent to the former in at least one sense (Wiggins et al., 
1981); the amount of variance attributable to each type of principal 
component should be the same whether computations are performed upon 
the rho-estimates or upon the empirical matrix. And fourth, one 
can compute a mean square residual (MSR) between the empirical and 
rho matrices to quantitatively assess the fit between the rho's.and 
the empirical correlations. Obviously, the smaller the MSR, the 
greater the fit. Finally, one can compute a Wilson-Hilferty z-score 
for the chi-square statistic (Wilson & Hilferty, 1931). This trans-
forms chi-squares with different degrees of freedom (df) into a 
standard normal deviate with 1 df allowing comparison of chi-squares 
across studies. The latter is useful in assessing the adequacy of a 
circumplex model across studies so as to provide a relative sense of 
goodness-to-fit of the model to data. 
Each of the procedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1982) is 
useful for assessing different aspects of the fit between data and 
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the circumplex model. The key test of "fit," the chi-square, suffers 
from one major drawback, however. The statistic is sensitive to any 
departures at all between the rho and empirical matrices. Thus, the 
empirical data would have to possess perfect circumplexity, especially 
when the sample size is large, to avoid a significant chi-square 
value. For hypothesis testing purposes, however, a perfect fit is 
seldom achievable. And, it may not be the most important question. 
The degree of fit between data and a circumplex model is ultimately 
more of value than whether a perfect fit does or does not occur. 
When degree of fit is the paramount question all of the pro-
cedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1981) except the chi-square are 
of value since each provides a quantitative index of goodness-of-fit. 
Unfortunately, though, they are not statistical indexes so that 
alpha and beta cannot be determined. 
Because the chi-square test appears to be the only statistical 
test currently available, the authors suggest a liberal interpreta-
tion should be made of it. Thus, instead of either rejecting or 
failing to reject the null hypothesis of "no circumplexity" the 
authors recommend the use of the Wilson-Hiferty ~-score. With the 
latter the adequacy of a circumplex model across studies can be 
made. 
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The procedures advocated by Wiggins et al. (1981) will be 
followed in the present study. James Steiger's FORTRAN IV program 
MULTICORR 2 will be used to compute the rho's. In addition, this 
program uses a Fisher's r-to-z transform, especially useful for small 
samples, and computes a chi-square based on this transformation. The 
calculation of the principal components underlying the matrix will 
be done upon the rho-estimates using the formulas provided by 
Wiggins et al. (1981). 
In addition to these procedures, however, two further types of 
analyses will be conducted. First, a principal components analysis 
will be conducted upon the raw data, specifically, the summed emotion 
scores across all the EMs. This analysis will be useful in determin-
ing the validity of the rating system. The obtained components can 
be "rotated." If an eight-factor solution can be rotated to "simple 
structure," then this will support the assumption that eight different 
emotions are being rated by the coding process. 
Second, since the principal components analysis will be done 
on the rho-estimates, for purposes of assessing circumplexity, some 
means of assessing the amount of total empirical variation used in the 
analysis will be useful. A method of estimating this percentage of 
empirical variation used in the circumplex analysis of the rho's is 
as follows (see Appendix F). The total empirical variation can be 
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partitioned into two components. The variance of the rho's measures 
one component and the MSR measures the other. The ratio: variance 
of the rho's I the sum of the rho-variance plus the MSR, provides a 
quantitative measure of the proportion of empirical variance utilized 
in the circumplex analysis. 
Theratioobtained in this fashion is useful because the circum-
plex analysis is not done on the total empirical variation in the raw 
matrix. Rather, it is done on the variation captured in the rho-
estimates. When principal components are extracted from the rho-
estimates, all of the empirical variation will not be used. The 
variation not used is measured by the MSR. Correspondingly, the 
variance attributable to each type of principal component, including 
circumplexity, will be inflated. The ultimate question is the amount 
of empirical variance due to circumplexity, not just the amount of 
variance in the rho's which can be attributed to circumplexity. 
A more accurate estimate of the empirical variation attributable 
to circumplexity can be obtained with the following ratio: variance 
in the rho's attributable to circumplexity principal component 
divided by the proportion of total empirical variation captured by 
the rho's. This ratio uses as its denominator the ratio given earlier. 
This will provide a quantitative index of the amount of empirical 
variation which can be attributed to circumplexity. 
Estimates of the principal components underlying a matrix can 
be obtained by direct computation from the rho-estimates (Wiggins 
et al., 1981). Alternatively, the components can be extracted from 
the empirical correlation matrix. The magnitude of variation 
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attributable to each type of principal component should be the same 
using either the estimation of the direct procedure (Wiggins et al., 
1981). Logically, however, there is a distinction between the 
procedures. Direct extraction from the empirical correlation matrix 
utilizes all of the variation between the variables. Computing the 
principal components from the rho-estimates uses only variance "cap-
tured" by the rho's. The latter will always be less than the total 
variation in an empirical matrix unless it has perfect circumplexity. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 53 college students recruited through the Loyola 
University, Department of Psychology Experimental Subject Pool. 
Subjects were offered course credit for their participation in the 
study. Five subjects were eliminated from the final sample either 
because they had not completed all of the data collections forms or 
because it was apparent that they had responded randomly on one or 
more of them. The final sample consisted of 48 subjects. There were 
14 males with a mean of 19 years (SD = 1.44) and 34 females with a 
mean age of 18.4 years (SD= .95). 
Procedure 
All subjects were tested in large groups of approximately 15. 
Each subject completed the following forms: The Emotions Profile 
Index (EPI; Plutchik & Kellerman, 1974), the Profile of Mood States-
Bipolar Form (POMS-B: Lorr & McNair, 1982), Five Early Memory Record-
ing Forms (EMRF; see Appendix A) and an Early Memories Ranking Sheet 
(see Appendix B). The materials were presented to each subject in a 
packet to which was affixed a disclosure and consent form (see 
Appendix C). Subjects read the disclosure form, and if they decided 
to participate on an informed basis, they were requested to sign the 
consent form and to proceed through the assessment package. 
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The order of the assessment forms in the complete package was 
randomized across subjects. Only the EMRFs were filled out in 
sequence from one to five, in order to preserve the order of recall 
of ERs for later analysis. It took approximately 1.5 hours to com-
plete the entire assessment package. 
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Scoring. The EPI and the POMS-B were scored following the 
criteria set out in their respective manuals. Only the Elation scale 
of the POMS-B was scored since the other scales were not relevant to 
the current study. The EMRF required each subject to recall an EM and 
then to complete a series of questions about the recalled event. The 
following information was requested: age at the time of the event, 
frequency of previous recall (just now, occasionally before, fre-
quently before), affective quality (pleasant, neutral, unpleasant), 
prose description of predominant emotions in the EM, and rating for 
the presence/absence of various sensory qualities (auditory, gustatory, 
kinesthetic, visual, and tactile). If visual imagery was reported, 
subjects were asked to describe whether others only, or the self 
could be observed in the memory. Presence of color qualities (black 
and white, or chromatic) was also requested. Finally, subjects were 
asked to describe any feelings or thought they had about the EM. 
After all EMs had been recalled, subjects were asked to rank order 
the EMs in terms of their current importance or meaning to the 
subjects. 
Rating the EMs for 8 basic emotions. Raters were two graduate 
students in clinical psychology. The current author served as the 
primary rater. The second rater was used to evaluate the interrater 
reliability of the eight basic emotion rating scales. The primary 
rater coded all ERs while the second rater coded 150 of the EMs, or 
approximately 62% of the sample (48 subjects X 5 EMs = 240 EMs). 
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The emotions coding manual is a considerably revised version of 
the manual developed by Wynne and Plutchik (1974). The revised manual 
is included here as Appendix D. The primary revisions were as follows: 
The original preface describing Plutchik's circumplex model of emo-
tions was excluded; subjective emotion terms describing combinations of 
the eight basic emotions of the Plutchik model, obtained from Plutchik 
(1980), were included; and finally, the scoring criteria were reor-
ganized and amplified by information drawn from Plutchik (1980). 
To present the occurrence of rater bias which would result in a 
spurious confirmation of the circumplex model being evaluated, the 
following procedures were adopted. The coders rated EMs for only one 
emotion at a time. The ratings were then placed on summary sheets (see 
Appendix E). The order in which the eight basic emotions were coded 
was randomized to prevent an order of rating effect (Guilford, 1954) 
such that ratings adjacent in time would show greater inter-correla-
tions. Guilford argues this order of rating effect is sufficiently 
strong to warrant consideration. By randomizing the order of rating 
and by rating only one emotion at a time, spurious inter-correlations 
between emotions should be either minimized or created in such a way 
that they would detract from the pattern sought in the data. 
The eight emotions were rated using a 7-point scale. Zero indicated 
the emotion was not present. A score from 1 to 6 was used for inten-
sity of the emotion if it was judged present. The verbal descriptions 
for intensity at each numerical weight were as follows: 1 =very 
slightly, 2 = slightly, 3 = fairly, 4 = strongly, 5 = very strongly, 
and 6 = extremely. 
Reliability of the Scoring 
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In examining the inter-rater reliability for each emotion scale 
several indices of agreement between the raters were computed. The 
first two indices indicated the raters' agreement on: 1) the presence 
versus absence of the emotion, and 2) disagreement on the rated in-
tensity of the emotion larger than 3 scale points. The final index, 
a Pearson E.• was computed on the final score made after re-rating of 
initial scores disagreeing more than 3 scale points. The steps in 
this procedure were 1) familiarization with the emotion coding manual 
and 2) rating of each EM for presence/absence and intensity. Initial 
ratings were then compared for rater agreement on each type of judg-
ment (presence/absence and intensity). When rater disagreements were 
larger than 3 scale points, raters were so advised and asked to re-read 
and re-score the EM. Re-ratings were then combined with the appro-
priate initial ratings (i.e., unchanged ratings) and a Pearson corre-
lation was computed to assess reliability between raters. 
Table 4 presents the data on EM ratings for each emotion. It 
can be observed that final ratings were reasonably similar to one 
another as assessed by the correlation coefficients. Table 4 also 
suggests that several of the emotions were more difficult to score. 
The emotion of "expectancy" showed initial disagreements on the 
present/absent judgment 19% of the time. A similar score occurred 
for disgust. However, anger, fear, sadness, and acceptance achieved 
Table 4 
Reliability Scores for the Emotion Rating 
Disagreements Disagreements 
on Presence vs. Larger Than 
Emotion Pearson r* Absence ** 3 Scale Points** 
Anger .92 2.6% 0% 
Fear .91 8.6% 2% 
Happy .85 14.6% 3% 
Sad .92 8.6% 2.6% 
Expect .80 19.0% 30.5% 
Surprise .83 16.0% 14. 61~ 
Accept .86 4.0% 10.0% 
Disgust .97 19.0% 30.0% 
Average .88 11.5% 11.6% 
*These scores were computed after consultation. 
**These scores were computed prior to consultation, and were 
calculated by the following formula: index scores/150, e.g., for 
anger, there were 4 disagreements on the present or absent 
judgment and therefore 4/150 = 2.6%. 
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fairly high levels of initial agreement for both the presence/absence 
and intensity judgments. The final inter-rater correlations for the 
more difficult to code emotions are also lower than for the easier 
emotions indicating that re-rating did not entirely alleviate the 
difficulty of the scoring process. However, all final ratings achieved 
a minimum inter-rater reliability coefficient of .80 and, therefore, 
the rating process was considered sufficiently reliable to warrant 
the use of the ratings for subsequent analysis. 
Validity of the Scoring System 
Two aspects of the validity of the scoring system are addressed: 
(1) the degree of circumplexity (and the specific similarity/polarity 
relations) between each of the emotions, and (2) the validity of the 
assumption that eight distinct emotions are being scored by the 
system. 
At this point in the analysis of the data the distinctness of 
the eight emotions is the paramount issue. To provide an empirical 
assessment of this a principal components analysis of the ratings 
was done through SPSS-X. An average emotion score was used for this 
analysis since there are relatively few subjects in the present sample 
though it should be noted that there are six for each emotion. Thus, 
each subject provided one emotion score (the average across all five 
EMs) for each of the eight emotions. These scores for all subjects 
were intercorrelated. The resulting matrix was submitted to a prin-
cipal components analysis with the number of factors to be extracted 
set at eight. The factors extracted were then rotated to a "simple 
structure" solution using a varimax rotation and a Kaiser 
normalization. This type of rotation attempts to load only one var-
iable highly on a factor while reducing the loadings of all other 
variables to the minimum possible. If this is achieved, a "simple 
structure" is obtained which indicates the degree to which each var-
iable may be considered a distinct "factor" underlying the variation 
in the data. 
Table 5 presents the rotated factor matrix for the averaged 
emotion scores. It can be seen that each emotion variable does, 
indeed, load highly on only one factor. The second highest loading 
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of a variable on a factor (for all factors) never exceeds .20, indi-
cating simple structure was achieved. Thus, the rating system appears 
to be measuring the presence of eight distinct emotions in ERs. 
A careful inspection of the factors in terms of the most positive 
and most negative loadings (i.e., polarity) also indicates where 
deviations from Plutchik's (1980) circumplex model are occurring. 
However, an analysis of the circumplexity of the emotions will be 
reserved for the discussion in the Results section. There the extent 
of circumplexity as assessed by the Wiggins et al. (1981) method using 
the estimated rho's will be complemented by the current principal 
components analysis done on the raw data. 
Identifying "Screen Memories" 
Freud (1901/1965: Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982) used four 
criteria to identify "screen memories": 1) they were affectively 
"neutral" or lacked emotional tone; 2) they were repetitively 
recalled spontaneously; 3) they were predominantly visual in sensory 
imagery; and 4) the rememberer was able to observe him- or herself 
Table 5 
The Rotated Factor Matrix of the Principal Components in Emotion Scores1 
Variable2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Surprise • 97261 .09782 .05422 .03429 -.01346 -.01832 .16425 - .11334 
Sadness .09972 . 96546 . 07706 .02426 -.01321 .10303 .07289 -.18791 
Anger .05482 .07658 . 96972 .99395 -.19827 .07427 .02345 -.07338 
Acceptance .03489 .02424 .00376 • 96250 .15134 -.15835 -.11111 .10701 
Joy -.01375 -.01382 -.20839 .15510 .95462 -.94643 .00120 .13671 
Disgust -.01986 .10809 .07891 -.16401 - .04 775 .95035 .19925 .06427 
Fear .17573 .97423 .02380 -.11420 .00146 .19838 .95211 .06427 
Anticipate -.12292 -.20169 -.07941 .11382 .14207 -.09917 .06541 .94375 
1
,N=48. The data were averaged emotion scores (across five early memories) for each subject. The 
emotion scores were intercorrelated and the resulting matrix was submitted to a principal components 
analysis. The extracted components were then rotated using a varimax procedure with a Kaiser 
normalization. The procedure was done with SPSS-X. 
2 The sequence of emotions in this column is not Plutchik's (see Figure 2), but rather is that given 
in the computer output for the sake of convenience. 
in the memory image. The EMFRs inquire about these features of EMs. 
Using all four criteria, 50% of the total sample of subjects failed 
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to recall a "screen memory." However, 18 subjects recalled 1, 5 sub-
jects recalled 2, and 1 subject recalled 3 "screen memories." Thus, 
while "screen memories" did not comprise a large percentage of the EMs 
recalled (12.9% of all EMs), there were enough for subsequent analysis, 
i.e., their relation to the emotion variables in the current study. 
Identifying "Traumatic Memories" 
The criteria for identifying traumatic memories was quite 
simple. EMs containing any reference to the following themes were 
scored as traumatic: bodily injury, severe grief, loss of loved 
ones, violations of normative expectations (regarding love, intimacy, 
and friendship), death, and violence. An example of a violation of a 
normative expectation regarding love is: A subject reported an EM of 
when his mother had been away from home vacationing for a period of 
time. When she returned home he was sitting on the front steps of 
his house with his sister. He saw her get out of his father's car. 
He jumped over his sister and ran to her. She refused to hug or kiss 
him and rebuked him for not helping his younger sister approach the 
car with him. He recalled feeling shamed and saddened. 
Two raters coded all EMs and made a judgment as to whether the 
memory was traumatic. Both raters agreed that 150 memories were not 
traumatic, that 64 were traumatic, and disagreed on the presence of 
trauma in 26 EMs. Thus, overall raters agreed 89% of the time (i.e., 
214/240 = 89%) on the presence of trauma in the EMs. 
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Statistical Analysis 
Statistical analysis of the data in terms of its circumplexity 
was achieved using the Fortran IV program developed by James Steiger 
(Wiggins et al., 1981) entitled MULTICORR Version 2. This program is 
generalized for the detection of "pattern" in correlation matrices 
with magnitudes up to 21. The parameters of the program were set at 
values conforming to the logic of circumplex structure in an 8 x 8 
matrix. The principal components, eigenvalues and eigenvectors, 
and Mean-Squared Residual were computed by calculator from the pro-
grams output (i.e., the rho-estimate) using the formulas supplied in 
Wiggins et al. (1981). 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Discussion of the results is organized around five aspects of 
the data: 1) the "survey" characteristics of EMs; 2) the relation 
between the "state" (POMS-B) and "trait" (EPI) measures of emotion 
or mood; 3) the relation between emotions experienced by subjects 
("state" and "trait") and emotions rated in EMs; and 5) evidence for 
circumplexity between emotions rated in EMs. 
The "Survey" Characteristics of EMs 
Table 6 presents the data collected on the content features of 
EMs. The figures in the table refer to the percentage of EMs sub-
jects rated as having the content feature. Figures are given for 
males, females, and the combined sample. Also included in column 4 
are the comparable figures obtained by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz 
(1982) with the college-age portion of their sample. 
A striking feature of Table 6 is the similarity between the 
figures obtained with the two independent samples of subjects in the 
two studies. It would appear that the general content features of 
EMs are very similar for this subject age group. 
There was only one statistically significant sex difference. 
Females stated they could observe themselves in their memory imagery 
for 73.3% of their EMs. Males only rated 48.5% of their EMs as 
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Table 6 
Content Features of Early Memories and Characteristics 
of the Subject Sample 
Subject Characteristics 
Kihlstrom and 
Feature Men Women Combined Harackiewicza 
fl of Subject 14 34 48 164 
Mean Age 19 18.4 18.7 
SD 1.4 .95 1.12 
Total Number of 
Early Memories 70 170 240 164 
Percentage of Early Memories with Content Feature 
Clarity of Memoryc 
cloudy 23 22 22.5 24.7 
clear 46 55 52.3 44.3 
vivid 31 22 24.6 31.0 
Frequency of Prior 
Recall of Memoryc 
just now 24 25 24.5 
occasionally 
before 57 60 59.5 69.6 
frequently 
before 18.5 15 15.8 24.1 
Affective Rating 
of Memoryc 
Pleasant 35.7 36.4 36.25 43.0 
Neutral 22.8 25.3 24.6 29.7 
Unpleasant 41.4 38.2 39.2 27.2 
Visual Presence of 
Self in Memoryc 48.5 73.3 66.3 58.1 
Memory in Colorc 71.4 74 73.5 71.0 
Memory Achromaticc 24.3 26 25.6 29.0 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Percentage of Early Memories with Content Feature 
Feature Men Women 
Kihlstrom and 
Combined Harackiewicza 
Sensory Qualities 
Present in Memory 
visual 
auditory 
olfactory 
tactile 
kinesthetic 
gustatory 
Judged 
c Imagery 
Memories Meeting Criteria 
for Freudian Screen 
Memoriesd 
Judged to Possess 
Trauma Contentd 
Judgment of Age At Which 
Event Occurredc 
98.5 
31.4 
15.7 
38.6 
41. 7 
5.7 
7.1 
26.5 
94.4 99.1 98.1 
47.7 42.5 32.9 
7.6 10.0 10.8 
35.8 36.6 42.2 
47.6 45.8 54.4 
7.0 6.7 2.5 
15.2 12.9 
28.6 27.0 26.7 
Mean (Years) 6.0 5.2 5.6 3.91 
1.26 SD (Years) 
Range (Weeks and 
1.4 1.4 1.4 
3-11 yrs. 7 wks-
Years) 18 yrs. 
aData in this column obtained from Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz (1982, 
Table 1). Missing entries indicate lack of comparable data. 
bKihlstrom & Harackiewicz (1982) scored any early memories with 3 of 
Freud's 4 criteria as a "screen memory." Therefore, their data on 
this content features are not identical to those of the present 
study. However, an intercorrelation (with the current subjects) of 
all four features in early memories showed that they were highly 
correlated with one another at statistically significant levels. 
Therefore, the data from the two studies may be generally if not 
strictly comparable. 
cSubjects judged this content feature. 
dThe experimenter judged this feature. 
based entirely on ratings or judgments 
The "trauma" feature was judged by the 
For "screen memories" it was 
provided by the subject. 
investigator alone. 
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having this feature. The difference (.!:,( 46) = 2.80, .E. <.01) is signi-
ficant. More will be said about this difference when "screen memor-
ies" are discussed later since the "self-seen" variable is related to 
the former as well. 
As a combined group the subjects rated 76.9% of the EMs as 
either "clear" or "vivid." Only 22.5% of them were rated as "cloudy." 
Over 73% of them were rated as having color imagery. And visual, 
auditory, and kinesthetic sensory imagery predominated in the entire 
sample. Finally, 75.3% of the EMs were rated as having been either 
"occasionally" or "frequently" recalled before the experiment. Thus, 
it appears that subjects find their EMs to be quite clear and memor-
able. 
The ratio of "pleasant" to "unpleasant" EMs was approximately 1. 
This ratio is different from that reported by previous investigators 
(Dudycha & Dudycha, 1933, 1941; Kihlstrom & Harackiewicz, 1982; 
Walfogel, 1948) who report a ratio closer to 2:1. 
Twenty-seven (27%) percent of the EMs were rated by the inves-
tigators as having "traumatic content." This figure accords well 
with the data obtained by Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) who ob-
tained a percentage of 26.6. This figure is also close to the per-
centage rated as "unpleasant" by the subjects. 
The average age of the EMs as rated by subjects was 5.6 years. 
The women reported a much larger range of dates for their EMs than 
did the men. Walfogel (1948) reports the same phenomena. On the 
average, then, the EMs studied here are 13 years old. 
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The Emotional Characteristics of EMs 
Subjects were asked to rate the affective qualities of their 
EMs in a global way as either "pleasant," "neutral," or "unpleasant" 
in overall affective tone. However, since the investigators rated 
each EM for the presence and intensity of the eight basic EPI emo-
tions it is possible to more finely assess the emotional qualities of 
the memories. 
Table 7 presents the data collected on all of the emotion 
variables studied: EPI emotions, EM-rated emotions, and the POMS-B 
Elation-Depression scores assessing the current mood-state of the 
subjects. Four sununary emotion scores are also introduced in this 
table for both the eight emotions in the EPI and in the EMs: Sum 
Positive Emotions (the simple sum of the acceptance, joy, and expec-
tancy scores); Sum Negative Emotions (the simple sum of the fear, 
anger, surprise, disgust, and sadness scores); Total Emotion (the 
simple sum of all eight emotions scores); and Sum Positive/Total 
Emotion (the ratio of the three positive emotion scores to the five 
negative emotion scores). A fifth sununary score was developed based 
on the subjects' affective ratings of EMs. "Pleasant," "neutral," and 
"unpleasant" subjects' ratings were assigned scores of 3, 2, and 1, 
respectively, and the average ratings across the 5 EMs per subject 
were called the Mean EM Affect score. 
The mean POMS-B Elation-Depression score for the entire sample 
was 46.40 (SD= 9.99). This is a normative standardized t-score (i.e., 
mean = 50, SD = 10) so the present sample is neither very elated nor 
depressed as a group. Males had a mean of 44.38 (SD= 9.76) and 
Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Emotion Variables: Emotions 
Profile Index (EPI), Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form Elation-
Depression Scale (POMS-B), Emotion Rateda in Early Memories 
(EM Emotion), and the Emotion Summary Scores 
N = 48 Mean Standard Deviation 
POMS-Bi 46.40 9.99 
EPI Emotion b 
Acceptance 20.94 4.74 
Joy 16.40 4.10 
Anticipation 19.06 4.78 
Anger 7.23 4.84 
Disgust 8.02 4.53 
Sadness 5.40 3.98 
Surprise 10.98 3.97 
Fear 15.81 4. 72 
Sum Positive~ 56.23 7.31 
Sum Negative 36.30 7.60 
Total Emotionef 92.31 4.33 
Sum Pos./Total .61 .08 
EM Emotiong 
Acceptance 1.58 .81 
Joy 1.35 .90 
Anger .88 .92 
Disgust .53 .66 
Sadness .88 .81 
Surprise 2.20 .95 
Fear 1.53 .90 
Sum Positive~ 3.98 1.81 
Sum Negative 6.00 2.48 
Total Emotionef 9.96 2.53 
Sum Pos./Total .41 .16 
Mean EM Affecth 2.01 .40 
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Table 7 (continued) 
NOTES: :The investigators rated emotions in EMs. 
The EPI raw score (Raw Score Range: 0-29) means and SD are 
reported. 
c 
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dThe sum of acceptance, joy, and anticipation scores. 
The sum of anger, disgust, sadness, surprise, and fear scores. 
~The sum of all 8 emotion scores. 
The ratio of the Sum Positive and Total Emotion scores. 
gEmotions rated on a 7-point scale: 0 = absent, 1-2 = low 
hintensity, 3-4 =moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity. 
The subject global affective ratings of "pleasant," "neutral," 
and "unpleasant" were assigned scores of 3, 2, 1, respectively 
and the mean score across the 5 EMs each subject recalled and 
.rated =Mean EM Affect score. 
1 The POMS-B mean is reported as a t-score. 
females of 4 5. 85 (SD 
not significant. 
13.59). The difference between the means is 
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The most intense emotions in EMs were acceptance, joy, surprise, 
and fear. This accords with the findings of Dudycha and Dudycha (1933, 
1941) and Walfogel (1948) who both found fear to be the most common 
negative emotion in EMs; and joy to the most prevalent positive 
emotion. Table 8 lists the average number of EMs per subject in which 
an emotion was identified. The most intense EPI emotions were accep-
tance, joy, fear, and anticipation. This suggests some degree of 
correspondence between the two types of emotion measures, so to 
better assess this EM-emotions and EPI-emotions were intercorrelated. 
Table 9 presents the intercorrelation matrix. Also included in the 
table are the POMS-B and Mean EM Affect scores. Of the 81 correla-
tions between EM-emotion and EPI-emotion scores only three are sig-
nificant: EM-acceptance and EPI-fear (.!:_ = .37, E. <.01) and EPI-anger 
(.!:_ = - • 30, .£ <. 05); and EM-disgust and EPI-acceptance (.!:_ = • 31, .£ <. 05) • 
It appears that even though the mean scores for the EPI and EM emo-
tions are proportionately similar, there is almost no linear relation 
between the two types of measures. 
There are, however, two patterns of correlations in Table 9 
which merit interest. The POMS-B and EPI-emotion scales show several 
sensible and significant correlations. The POMS-B and EPI-joy scale 
are positively correlated (.!:_ = .36, .£ <.05), while the POMS-B corre-
lates negatively with EPI-anger (.!:_ = -.30, E. <.05) and EPI-sadness 
(.!:_ = -.40, .£ <.01). The positive correlation between EPI-surprise 
and the POMS-B (E_ = .32, .£ <.05) is unexpected, though, since it is 
Table 8 
Average Number of Early Memories Per Subject in Which 
an Emotion Was Identified 
Mean SD 
Anger 1.48 1.21 
Fear 2.59 1.10 
Surprise 3.30 1.08 
Expectation 2.65 1.20 
Disgust .80 .93 
Acceptance 2.70 1.15 
Joy 2.17 1.09 
Sadness 1.53 1.06 
NOTE: N_ = 48. Five early memories per subject. 
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Table 9 
Intercorrelation Matrix of Emotions Profile Index Scales, Emotions Rateda in Early Memories, the 
Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale, and the Mean EM Affect Scoreb 
EMOTIONS RATED IN EARLY MEMORIES 
Accept Fear Surprise Sad Disgust Anger Anticip. Joy POMSc 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Accept (1) .14 .24 .07 .26 .31* -.05 .05 .16 .28 
Fear (2) .37** -.01 -.04 -.06 .09 -.04 .01 -.002 -.13 
Surprise (3) -.28 .002 -.09 .01 .13 .05 .04 -.14 .32* 
Mean 
EM Aff. d 
.06 
-.06 
.02 
Sad (4) -.11 -.11 .03 .07 -.14 .07 -.15 .01 -.40** .07 
Disgust (5) -.14 -.07 .07 -.15 -.26 -.02 -.005 -.01 -.06 -.16 
Anger (6) -.30* -.10 .11 .22 -.01 .27 -.14 -.12 -.30* -.12 
Anticipation (7) .11 -.08 -.07 -.22 -.11 -.11 -.07 -.13 .10 -.11 
Joy (8) .14 .05 .02 .13 .23 -.04 .02 .10 .36* .21 
POMS-B E-Dc (9) .06 .oo .06 .00 .10 -.08 .10 -.16 .07 
Mean EM Aff d (10) .24 -.36* -.37** -.27 -.15 -.32* .26 .61*** 
Table 9 (continued) 
aThe investigators rated the emotions in early memories. 
bThe mean EM Affect score is derived from subjects' global ratings of their EMs as "pleasant," "neutral," 
and "unpleasant." Each rating was assigned a score of 3, 2, 1, respectively, and the average across 
the 5 EMs = Mean Affect Score. 
cThe Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale. 
dThe Mean EM Affect Score; see Note b. 
*.E. <.05 
**.E. <.01 
***p <.0001 
considered a negative emotion by Plutchik (1980). 
The relations between the Mean EM Affect score and EM-emotions 
are interesting insofar as they probably indicate the more specific 
bases for the subjects' global EM affective ratings. Thus, the Mean 
EM Affect score correlates positively with EM-rated joy (!_ = .61, .E. 
< .0001), and negatively with EM-rated joy (!_ = -.36, .E. <.05), sur-
prise (!_ = -.37, .E. <.01), and anger (!_ = -.32, .E. <.05). This 
supports the impression gained from the means in Table 6 that the 
emotions of fear, joy, and surprise are predominant as emotional 
features of the EMs. In addition, surprise does appear to be a 
negative emotion in the context of EMs since it is significantly and 
negatively correlated with subjects' global affective ratings of the 
pleasantness of the memories. 
The Relation Between EM-Rated Emotions and Subjects' Three Global 
Affective Ratings of the Memories 
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The investigators rated the eight emotions in EMs. The subject's 
3 global affective judgments of "pleasant," "neutral," and "unpleasant" 
were correlated with the investigator's ratings of the presence and 
intensity of the 8 emotions. TablelOpresents the correlation matrix. 
The figures refer to the number of EMs each subject rated for each 
global affect category and the investigator's emotion intensity 
ratings for the EMs (summed across the 5 EMs) for each subject. 
The pattern of results indicates the investigator's more 
specific emotion ratings show systematic and sensible relations with 
the subject's more global affect judgments. If we assume that each 
specific emotion formed the basis for the global subject's judgments, 
Table 10 
The Relation Between the Investigator's Ratings of Eight Emotions in 
Early Memories and Subjects' More Global Affective Judgments of 
Them as "Pleasant," "Neutral," and "Unpleasant"a 
Experimenter 
Rated Emotions 
in Early Memories 
Anger 
Fear 
Surprise 
Disgust 
Sadness 
Joy 
Expectancy 
Acceptance 
Sum Positivea 
S N . b um egat1ve 
Total Emotionc 
Sum Pos/Totald 
Subject's Global Affect Ratings 
of the Early Memories 
"Pleasant" 
-.30* 
-.21 
-.29* 
-.17 
-.31* 
.66**** 
.33* 
.34* 
.64**** 
-.44** 
.02 
.70**** 
"Neutral" 
.13 
-.25 
-.05 
.15 
.23 
-.41** 
-.32* 
-.42** 
-.53**** 
.05 
-.34* 
-.41** 
"Unpleasant" 
.28* 
.49*** 
.42** 
.09 
.16 
-.46** 
-.13 
.07 
-.34* 
.51**** 
.26 
-.52**** 
aThe correlations are between the number of early memories (of 5) 
subjects rated in each affect category and the investigator's 
intensity ratings for each emotion averaged across the 5 memories 
for each subject. 
* 
.£. <.05 
** 
.£. <.01 
***.£. <.001 
**** 
.£. <.0001 
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then the following conclusions can be made. Subject's judgments of 
an EM as "pleasant" are based on the presence of higher levels of the 
three positive emotions of joy (.!:_ = .66, E. <.0001), acceptance (.!:_ = 
.34, E <.02), and expectancy (E_ = .33, E. <.02). They are also based 
on lower intensities of the three negative emotions of anger (E_ = -.30, 
E. <.03), surprise (.!:_ -.29, E. <.05), and sadness (.!:_ = -.31, E. <.03). 
Subjects' global affective ratings of an EM as "neutral" appear 
to be based on the presence of lower intensities of the emotions of 
joy (.!:_ = -.41, E. <.004), acceptance (.!:_ = -.42, E. <.003), and expec-
tancy (.!:_ = -.32, E. .025). Finally, lower intensities of fear (.!:_ = 
-.25, E. <.08) are probably related to this judgment since its presence 
at a higher intensity might alter the subject's judgments from 
"neutral" to "unpleasant" in overall affective-tone. 
The subject's judgment of EMs as "unpleasant" appears related 
to the presence of high intensities of the negative emotions of anger 
(.!:_ = .28, E. <.056), fear (E_ = .49, E. <.001), and surprise (E_ = .42, E. 
< .003). Similarly, it is based on the presence of very low inten-
sities of emotion of joy(.!:_= -.46, E. <.001). 
It seems sensible to conclude that the investigator's ratings 
of the specific emotions in EMs show strong relationships with the 
subject's more global affective judgments of EMs. Additionally, 
Plutchik's (1980) assessment of surprise as a negative emotion is 
again borne out by the EM data. Finally, global affective judgments, 
while valid, must also be seen as obscuring more specific relations 
between discrete emotions and the affective quality of an experience. 
The two independent measures appear to provide complementary, but not 
identical information regarding the affective qualities of an indi-
vidual's remembered experience. 
"Screen Memories" and the "Self-Seen" Variable 
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When EMs are identified as "screen memories" using all four of 
Freud's criteria, 12.9% were observed. When only the presence of self 
in EM imgaery (the "self-seen" variable) is considered, 66.3% are 
identified. Females rated a larger proportion of their EMs as having 
this variable (73.3%) than did the males (48.5%). 
The frequency of screen memories reported by subjects was 
correlated with all EPI emotion scales including four summary vari-
ables: Sum Positive Emotions (acceptance, joy, and expectancy), Sum 
Negative Emotions (anger, fear, surprise, disgust, and sadness), Total 
Emotion (sum of all 8 emotions), and Sum Positive/Total Emotion. 
These summary emotion variables are conceptually distinct. Sum Pos-
itive and Sum Negative index the characteristic intensity with which 
subjects experience the positive and negative emotions, respectively. 
These variables increase as subjects' characteristic intensity level 
for each emotion increases. The Sum Positive/Total Emotion indexes 
the relative balance of intensities of positive emotions to all emo-
tions. And the Total Emotion variable indexes the subjects' charac-
teristic emotion intensity irrespective of what quality or valence 
the emotion may have (Plutchik, 1980). As such, it indexes the 
individual difference variable of how intensely the subject exper-
iences emotion per se. 
Several of the EPI emotion variables correlated significantly 
with the frequency of "screen memories." Specifically: Acceptance 
(.!: = -.27, E. <.06), Sadness (.!: = .31, E. <.05), Anger (.!: = -.27, E. < 
.03), Sum Negative Emotion (.!: = .32, E. <.05), and Sum Positive/Total 
Emotion (.!: = -.30, E. <.05). 
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Since one of the criteria for a screen memory is that the subject 
rate it as being neutral in overall affective tone, it was decided 
to correlate such memories with emotion rated in EMs by the investi-
gator. When this was done, the following significant correlations 
resulted. Specifically, EM-Emotions [Acceptance(.!:= -.32, E. <.05), 
and Sum Positive Emotion (same as in EPI)(.!: = -.36, E. <.01)) were 
related to the frequency with which subjects recalled screen memories. 
Since the EPI measures "trait" levels of characteristically 
experienced emotions and the EM-emotion measures the emotional char-
acteristics within the sample of EMs, the following sununarization of 
the observed relations is warranted. Individuals who report higher 
levels of negative affect and lower levels of the emotion of acceptance 
both in their current lives and in their autobiographical memories 
also show a higher incidence of screen memories. 
Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) found the personality "trait 
of harm-avoidance" (measured by the Jackson Personality Inventory) 
predicted the occurrence of screen memories in their sample. Harm-
avoidance is considered a characteristic tendency to avoid anxiety-
provoking situations. "Anxiety" is a somewhat vague and general term 
for what can more precisely be measured as combinations of fear and 
(two or more of the following) anger, shame, guilt, and interest/ 
excitement (Izard, 1972, 1977). The findings of Kihlstrom and 
Harackiewicz (1982) can be related to the present results if the 
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following assumption is made. High levels of negative emotions (EPI 
fear, anger, sadness, surprise, and disgust) and low levels of 
acceptance are in a general way equivalent to anxiety. In other words, 
the two studies are measuring anxiety but in different ways. 
There is no conceptual difficulty in equating a high EPI Sum 
Negative Emotions score with anxiety since Izard (1972) has shown 
that the latter can be more finely differentiated into the emotions 
of fear, anger, and sadness. A low EPI acceptance score also is 
related to anxiety when the specific qualities of this emotion are 
considered. Plutchik (1980) defines and measures the emotion of 
acceptance at several levels of analysis. At the level of subjective 
feelings it is equated with the affective "states" of "calmness," 
"agreeableness," "contentment" and "warmth." At the behavioral level 
it is equated with tendencies toward "approach" and "affiliation." 
It should be clear that anxiety is in some sense the opposite of the 
subjective and behavioral referents of "acceptance" as it is con-
ceptualized and measured in the EPI. Thus, it is very likely that the 
current results complement those of Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982). 
In addition to complementing the results of the previous study, 
however, the present results also extend them in a very important way; 
i.e., they provide a more direct type of evidence for Freud's concep-
tualization of the psychological meaning of screen memories than is 
provided by the previous study. Freud (1901/1965) believed that such 
memories implied an ongoing conflictual process in the rememberer both 
at the level of past and current experience. The memory was believed 
to be of the past conflictual event (i.e., a "traumatic Oedipal 
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experience"). The current conflict was believed to be represented by 
the "screening" of the original memory content by more innocuous and 
less anxiety-provoking detail devoid of emotional-tone. Another 
measure of the conflictual process was that such memories were repe-
titively recalled despite their apparently banal content. The final 
indicator was the imaginative elaboration of the memory content such 
that the subjects could "observe the self" in the memory imagery. This 
last was direct evidence that the original memory content had been 
altered in some way. 
The present study provides more direct evidence for Freud's 
hypothesis because the emotional qualities of the memories themselves 
were measured. Thus, high levels of negative emotions (Sum Negative 
Emotions) and low levels of acceptance in both the trait instrument 
(the EPI) and in the memories themselves correlated with the fre-
quency of reporting screen memories. Of course, the present results 
do not address Freud's hypothesis about the nature of "Oedipal 
traumas" as the ultimate basis for screen memories. 
Trauma Memories 
Twenty-six (26%) percent of all EMs were rated as having trau-
matic content. Two questions were considered. First, are trauma 
memories rated by subjects as being more frequently recalled than non-
traumatic memories; and second, did such memories show a relationship 
to either trait (EPI) or "state" (POMS-B) emotion? A major diagnostic 
sign of stress and trauma-related pathology is the occurrence of in-
trusive, repetitive imagery (i.e., memories) of the traumatic event 
accompanied by intense dysphoric and anxious affect. Of course, such 
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severe symptoms were not expected for EMs, but rather the question was 
whether there might be any similarity at all. 
Subjects' judgments of the extent of previous recall of each 
EM was compared for the trauma and the non-trauma meories. The 
proportion of each type of EM in each recall category ("just now," 
"occasionally before," and "frequently before") was tabulated. The 
proportion of traumatic EMs in each category of recall frequency is: 
Now= .25, Occasionally Before= .564, and Frequently Before= .187. 
For non-traumatic EMs it is: Now = .268, Occasionally Before = .566, 
and Frequently Before = .166. The differences between proportions 
for each type of memory was examined using a ~-test (Guilford & 
Fruchter, 1978). All three tests were non-significant. Similarly, 
the correlation between incidence of traumatic EMs and state (POMS-B, 
Elation-Depression) and trait (EPI Sum Positive/Total Affect scales) 
emotions across subjects produced no significant correlations. 
Mood-Dependent Recall of Early Memories 
Several analyses were conducted of the relation between the mood 
state of subjects and the rated (by subject) affective quality of EMs. 
These analyses correspond to Hypotheses 1-5 presented earlier. 
The first issue examined was whether there was an overall in-
teraction between mood states and EM affective quality as is predicted 
by Bower (1981). In other words, can MDR be observed regardless of 
the intensity level of the mood state of subjects. 
The categorization of subjects as "happy," "neutral," and "sad" 
was made on the basis of the sample mean on the POMS-B Elation-
Depression scale (mean= 46.9, SD= 9.9). Subjects with scores one 
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standard deviation (SD) above the sample mean were considered "happy." 
"Neutral" subjects scored within one sd either side of the mean, and 
"sad" subjects scored below one sd from the sample mean. Neither 
the happy or sad subjects are normatively (i.e., POMS-B standardiza-
tion data) either very happy or very depressed. 
Table 11 presents a breakdown of subjects' rated affective 
quality of EMs (positive, neutral, negative) by current mood state of 
subject (happy, neutral, sad). The mean percentage of the 5 EMs 
recalled by each subject mood group in each EM affect category is 
tabulated. It can be seen that the happy subject recalled the largest 
percentage of happy EMs and the lowest percentage of sad EMs. However, 
sad and neutral subjects recalled approximately the same percentages 
of happy, neutral, and sad EMs. Thus, upon initial inspection of the 
data there appears to be an asymmetric MDR effect when the entire 
subject sample is considered. When a one-way ANOVA was conducted on 
the percentage of EMs rated as happy by each mood group, a non-signi-
ficant !. [!_( 2 , 45 ) = 1.68, ns.) was obtained. Thus, the asymmetric MDR 
pattern is non-reliable in terms of the group data. 
A second statistical analysis was conducted that examined the 
linear relations between subjects' mood states and the affective qual-
ities of EMs. The mean affect scores and the number of EMs rated 
positive, neutral, and negative by subjects were correlated with sub-
ject's POMS-B Elation-Depression score. Table 12 presents these 
statistics for males and females separately and as a group. None of 
the correlations reached statistical significance. A trend was ob-
served, however, for the more "elated" males to rate fewer numbers of 
Table 11 
Subject Mood Statea and Subject Ratings of the Affective qualityb 
of Their Early Memories: c Mean Percentage of Early Memories 
d for Each Mood State Group 
Subject's 
Mood Groups Positive 
Happy (B_ = 9) 51.0% 
"Neutral" (B_ = 21) 31.0% 
Sad (B_ = 18) 37.7% 
Affect Ratings of Memories 
Neutral Negative 
20.0% 28.8% 
26.6% 41.9% 
24.4% 37.7% 
aSubject mood assessed by the Profile of Mood State Bipolar Form 
Elation-Depression scale (POMS-B, E-D). 
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bSubjects rated their early memories as being either positive, neutral 
or negative in overall affective tone. 
cThere were a total of 240 early memories. Each subject recalled 5 
early memories. 
d The POMS-B, E-D mean score for the entire sample was 46.9 (SD= 9.9). 
The happy mood group scored above 57 on the POMS-B, E-D scale. The 
"neutral" mood group scored between 43-56, and the sad group scored 
below at or below 42 on this scale. 
Table 12 
Correlations Between Subject's Mood Statea and Their Ratings of 
Early Memories as Happy, Neutral, or Sad: Comparisons for 
Males, Females, and Total Sample 
POMS-B, E-D 
and b 
Mean EM Affect 
POMS-B, E-D 
and 
c II EMs Happy 
POMS-B, E-D 
and 
II EMs Neutralc 
POMS-B, E-D 
and 
ti EMs Sade 
Men 
(! = 14) 
.18 
.28 
-.006 
Women 
(! = 34) 
.05 
.06 
-.003 
-.02 
Combined 
(! = 48) 
.08 
.11 
-.11 
-.02 
~ood state as assessed by the Profile of Mood States Bipolar Form 
Elation-Depression scale (POMS-B, E-D). 
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bThe mean affect score is derived from subject ratings. A positive 
(happy) ratings was assigned a score of 3; a neutral rating was 
assigned a score of 2; and a negative (sad) rating was assigned a 
score of 1. The mean of these scores across 5 early memories consti-
tutes the mean affect score for the subject. 
cSubjects rated the early memory for this quality. 
d 
.£. <.10. All other correlations non-significant. 
EMs as neutral in affective tone (POMS-B, Elation-Depression score 
correlated with number of EMs rated as neutral by males, r 
.E. < .10) • 
-.35, 
A final analysis was conducted to test Hypothesis 5 that sub-
ject's mood intensity moderates the degree of MDR observed. Careful 
inspection of the "neutral mood group" in Table 11 suggests a subtle 
trend for this group to show more EMs rated as sad and fewer EMs 
rated as happy than the group which is identified as sadder. In 
effect they are doing the opposite of what one would expect. Figure 
5 graphs the data in Table 11 so this reversal for the moderates group 
can be more readily seen. 
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Hypothesis 5 predicted that the moderate mood-intensity group 
might show a different type of recall pattern than the more extreme 
mood-intensity groups. The groups were defined as "happy," "neutral" 
(moderate), and "sad" in Table 11 on the basis of the sample mean of the 
POMS-B Elation-Depression scale. An alternative method of categorizing 
the mood groups is possible, however, because this instrument has 
normative data which can be used for this purpose. The population 
mean for this instrument is 50 with a sd = 10 scale points. The 
"happy" mood group in Table 11 has only 9 subjects so it was decided 
not to further subdivide this group. However, the "sad" group has 
18 subjects. It is possible to extract 11 subjects from this group 
who have at or below a score of 36 which is 1.4 sd below the popula-
tion mean for the POMS-B scale. When "happy" and "sad" mood groups 
are defined in this way the data in Table 13 is obtained. 
Table 13 shows the mean proportion of EMs (out of a total of 5 
50 
40 
% of 
Early Memories 30 
20 
10 
0 
(41) 
(38) 
(28) 
(20) 
Sad Neutral 
90 
(51) 
Happy Mood 
Sad Mood 
(38) 
"Neutral" 
Mood 
(31) 
Happy 
Self-Rated Affective Quality of Memory 
aThe variables presented here correspond with each variable 
presented in Table 11. 
Figure 5. Graphic Presentation of Data in Table lla 
Table 13 
Mean Differences in the Proportion of Early Memories Rated as 
Positive and Negative by "Happy" and "Sad" Mood Groupsa: 
d 
"Moderate" Mood Subjects Removed 
Subject-Rated Affective Quality 
Mood Group Positive SD Negative SD t df 
Happy .511 .03 .288 .04 1.57 8 
(N=9) 
Sad .400 .05 .327 .05 -.73 10 
(N=ll) 
tb 5.24 -1.83 
df 18 18 
c 
.001 .05 
.E. 
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c 
.E. 
.10 
ns 
~ood groups defined by subject's score on the Profile of Mood States 
Bipolar Form Elation-Depression Scale. Happy subjects scored at or 
above a t-score of 57; the Sad subjects scored at or below a t-score 
of 36. The normative population mean for the scale is a t-score of 
50 (sd = 10). 
b 
.!_-test for matched samples. 
cAll probability values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses. 
dThe moderate group obtained t-scores between 37-55 on the mood 
scale (see note a). 
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EMs) each subject rated as positive and negative in overall affective 
tone with subjects divided into "happy" and "sad" mood groups. It 
can be seen that happy subjects recalled more positive EMs than did 
the sad subject group [.£(l8) = 5.14, .E. <.001, one-tailed]. The sad 
subjects also recalled more negative EMs than did the happy subjects 
[.£(l8) = -.1.83, .E. <.05, one-tailed]. There was also a statistical 
trend for the happy subjects to recall a larger number of positive 
than negative EMs [.£( 8) = 1.57, .E. < .10, one-tailed; _£-test for matched 
samples]. However, there was a reversal for the sad mood group. They 
actually recalled more positive EMs than negative EMs though this 
difference is probably not reliable since a statistical trend could 
not be found when a matched-sample _£-test was conducted [.£(lO) = 
- • 73, ns.]. 
Thus, when subject's mood state was categorized as happy or sad 
based on normative criteria rather than sample means, an asymmetric 
pattern of MDR was observed. When the small sample sizes (and the 
statistical trend for the happy group) are considered, it is not 
inconceivable to expect that a symmetric MDR pattern might be observed 
with a slightly larger sample. In any case, the present analysis 
supports Hypothesis 5 without any qualification in at least one sense. 
When the more extreme mood subjects are considered a more powerful 
MDR effect can be observed. This can be seen when the point-biserial 
correlation coefficients corresponding to various _£-test values are 
considered. For a t-test score of 5.24, r b = .776; and for -1.83, 
- -p 
!pb = .396. Both correlations exceed the magnitude of the correla-
tions observed when less extreme mood groups were compared in earlier 
r 
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statistical analyses. 
Circumplexity Structure of Emotions in EMs 
Tables 14-18 present the correlation matrices for the eight EPI 
emotions rated in EMs by the investigator. Table 19 is the correla-
tion matrix for the sununed emotion scores (i.e., the average inten-
sity rating for each emotion across all 5 EMs) for each subject. 
Table 20 presents the GLS rho-estimates generated by J. Steiger's 
MULTICORR 2 for each matrix. Also included in the last table are data 
on the following: chi-square goodness-of-fit test between the empir-
ical matrix and the rho-matrix; the mean square residual (MSR) between 
the rho and empirical matrices; the variance of the rho's; percentage 
of variance from the empirical matrices utilized in the circumplex 
analysis (see Appendix F); and the Wilson-Hilferty ~-score (Wilson 
& Hilferty, 1931) which transforms x2 s with variable degrees of 
freedom into a ~-score with 1 df to allow comparison across analyses. 
Table 21 presents the principal components extracted from the rho 
matrices (Wiggins, et al., 1981) in terms of the variance in the 
matrices which can be attributed to each type of principal component. 
Table 20 and 21 can be used to assist visual inspection of circumplex-
i ty in Tables 14-18. 
Inspection of Tables 14-18 reveals that the clearest degree of 
circumplexity occurs in Table 18 for EM 5 the last memory recalled by 
each subject. Recall that we are seeking a pattern of correlations 
in each successive minor diagonal that is initially positive, then 
zero-order, then negative, then more highly negative (see Table 3). 
There are departures from this pattern in Table 18 especially for the 
Table 14 
a b c Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 1 ' ' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 4144 
Fear (3) -2587 -3138 
Surprise (4) -1461 -0890 1618 
Sad (5) -0184 -2367 3336 3826 
Disgust (6) -2255 -1742 1825 0021 3234 
Anger (7) -1516 -0373 0122 0507 2203 0849 
Anticipate (8) 1238 2185 -2501 -1466 -1786 -2104 1078 
aDecimals are ommitted from the table. 
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6 
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity. 
CN = 48. 
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Table 15 
ab c Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 2 ' ' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 4940 
Fear (3) -4315 -1666 
Surprise (4) -0538 0473 1605 
Sad (5) -1524 -1628 0284 1203 
Disgust (6) -0404 -2350 1367 -0351 0903 
Anger (7) -0116 0901 1553 2358 2888 2058 
Anticipate (8) 0641 1172 -1998 -0484 -3794 -2371 -2138 
aDecimals are ommitted from the table. 
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6 
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity. 
CN = 48. 
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Table 16 
ab c Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 3 ' ' 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 3844 
Fear (3) -3000 -2172 
Surprise (4) -3771 -1002 4990 
Sad (5) -3248 -0723 2435 0993 
Disgust (6) -1214 -1335 3980 1568 1099 
Anger (7) -4381 -2336 1031 0258 3794 2593 
Anticipate (8) 5226 1464 -0776 -2942 -2218 0423 -2670 
aDecimals are ommitted from the table. 
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6 
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity. 
CN = 48. 
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Table 17 
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 4a,b,c 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 5409 
Fear (3) -1401 -2686 
Surprise (4) -1543 -0313 3295 
Sad (5) -1911 -3106 -0295 2219 
Disgust (6) -2815 -1313 0763 1097 2341 
Anger (7) -4263 -3347 -0757 0120 2423 1041 
Anticipate (8) 1400 -0188 0754 1277 -2056 -0538 -1793 
aThe decimals have been ommitted from the table. 
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using a 0-6 
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5-6 = high intensity. 
CN = 48. 
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Table le 
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in Early Memory Number 5a,b,c 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 5057 
Fear (3) -5291 3005 
Surprise (4) -1408 -0690 2087 
Sad (5) -3238 -1737 1505 0278 
Disgust (6) -1939 -3085 1355 0591 4597 
Anger (7) -1362 -1493 -0268 1732 0260 2965 
Anticipate (8) 3785 2766 -1530 -3482 -3334 -3428 -2213 
aDecimals are ommitted from the table. 
bThe eight emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6 
scale of intensity. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5 - 6 = high intensity. 
CN = 48. 
Table 19 
Intercorrelation of the Eight Emotions in the Sununed Emotion 
a h E 1 M . b,c,d Scores For t e ar y emories 
(1) (2) 
Joy (1) 
Accept (2) 3144 
Fear (3) -0246 -2325 
Surprise 
Sad 
Disgust 
Anger 
(4) -0481 
(5) -0703 
0408 
0048 
(6) -1462 -3463 
(7) -4062 -0415 
Anticipate (8) 3080 2314 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
3214 
1622 2283 
3979 0170 2362 
0702 1270 1803 1750 
0528 -2369 -3951 -2253 -2030 
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(8) 
aThe sununed emotions scores were the average intensity ratings for an 
emotion across all 5 early memories per subject. 
bThe deimals are ommitted from the table. 
cThe emotions were rated by the investigator using an 0-6 
intensity scale. 0 = absent, 1-2 = low intensity, 3-4 = 
moderate intensity, 5-6 =high intensity. 
dN = 48. 
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Table 20 
Generalized Least Square Estimates of the Rho Valuesa in the Inter-
correlation Matrices For All Five Early Memories Separately And As 
A Summed Variable: Statistical Analysis of the Population Estimates 
Parameter 
Rho 1 
Rho 2 
Rho 3 
Rho 4 
x2 
df=24 
Mean 
Squared d 
Residual 
N 
Variancea 
of Rho's 
Percent of 
Varianceb 
1 
1606 
0304 
-1051 
-0812 
39.4 
f 
48 
f 
f 
f 
Early Memories 
2 3 4 
0941 1739 1402 
-0297 0165 -0436 
-0467 -0850 -1406 
-0700 -1625 -1315 
49.2 71.36 40.6 
.025 .038 f 
48 48 48 
.0040 .0158 f 
13.7% 29.4% f 
-3.18 .003 f 
5 Summed 
2451 1400 
0705 -0030 
-1044 -0060 
-3144 -1500 
60.95 49.2 
.024 .030 
48 
.0430 .0105 
64% 25.9% 
-1. 49 -3.18 
aDecimal points are ommitted from the table of rho-estimates. 
bPercentage of variance from the empirical matrix of correlations used 
in the circumplex analysis. (See Appendix F for the rationale and 
method of calculating this percentage.) 
cWhile the same 48 subjects are used in all analyses, the "Sunnned" 
variable consists of the average emotion intensity score across all 
memories for each subject. 
d The mean squared residual is the mean of the squared deviations of 
each empirical correlation from its corresponding rho-estimate. 
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Table 20 (continued) 
eThe Wilson-Hilferty ~-score with 1 df. 
fCircumplexity not present. Therefore, statistics not calculated. 
Table 21 
Proportion of Variance in the Principal Components Obtained Through 
Circumplex Analysis of Emotion Scores Rateda in Early Memories Two, 
Th Fi d S d A All F . E 1 M . b,c ree, ve, an umme cross ive ar y emories 
102 
SAMPLE Circumplex General Polarity Orthogonality Specificity 
Early 
Memory 2 31. 72 12.07 21. 77 24.74 9.70 
Early 
Memory 3 38.21 13.10 19.91 20.11 8.65 
Early 
Memory 5 45.21 13.85 20.51 13.61 6.81 
Summed 
Early 
Memories 33.93 14.06 23.34 21.42 7.18625 
aThe investigator rated the presence and intensity of emotions in 
memories. 
bEarly memories one and four were not included since examination of 
the ordinary least sqaures estimates of the rho values obtained 
through MULTICORR indicated a lack of circumplexity. See Table 20. 
c ~ = 48 for all analyses. 
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following correlations: minor diagonal one (sadness and surprise 
.0278); minor diagonals two and six (see Table 3; these two diagonals 
represent emotions separated by one other emotion on the circumplex) 
show deviations for fear and joy (-.5291), anticipation and anger 
(-.3428), and anticipation and acceptance (.2766); minor diagonals 
three and five show deviations for disgust and fear (.1355), and anger 
and surprise (.1732); finally, minor diagonal four which should show 
only large negative correlations (if polarity is present and strong) 
shows a deviation for anger and fear (-.0268). Thus, 7 of the 28 
correlations show a deviation from an exact circumplex pattern. How-
ever, the remaining correlations do show the pattern indicative of 
circumplexity and this can be demonstrated by the rho-estimates for 
this matrix which are given in Table 17: rho 1 = .2451, rho 2 = 
.0705, rho 3 = -.1044, and rho 4 = -.3144. 
The MSR between the rho's and the empirical correlations in 
Table 18 is .024 which indicates the rho's are on the average fairly 
good estimates for each empirical correlation. Table 20 also shows 
that 64% of the variation in the empirical matrix was utilized in the 
circumplex analysis (variance of the rho's/variance of the rho's plus 
MSR = 64%, see Appendix F). Table 20 shows that 45.21% of the vari-
ation in the rho matrix for EM 5 can be attributed to circumplexity. 
Thus, 28.9% of the empirical variation can be accounted for by cir-
cumplexity (64% x .4521 = 28.9). 
The chi-square test recommended by Wiggins et al. (1982) is, as 
they argued, an overly severe method for assessing the adequacy of a 
circumplex model's fit to the empirical data. This test assessed the 
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degree of fit between the rho and empirical matrices. Any deviations 
between them increases the statistic. For EM 5 the chi-square = 60.95 
the largest observed with the present data. Since EM 5 also produced 
a clear circumplex structure (as indexed by the rho's, the principal 
components analysis, the MRS, and the percentage of empirical varia-
tion attributable to circumplexity), some type of resolution of this 
discrepancy must be considered. EM 5 probably produced the largest 
chi-square value because it is also the one with the largest absolute 
value of the rho's and empirical correlations. Therefore, the large 
deviations observed for 7 of the empirical correlations from perfect 
circumplexity (e.g., anger and fear= .0268 and is estimated by rho 4 
= -.3144) are overly influencing the statistical test. Since we are 
less concerned with perfect circumplexity than with the degree of 
observable circumplexity in the data, the statistic should probably 
be given a relative weight in the interpretation of the results. 
Table 20 and 21 show that while circumplexity was observable 
in EM 2, 3, and the summed emotion scores, it is less evident than in 
EM 5. The most important figures to compare are the percent of 
variance from the empirical matrix used in the circumplex analysis 
(Table 20) with the degree of circumplexity (Table 21) in the rho-
estimates. These two values indicate that the following proportions 
of empirical variation can be attributed to circumplexity in the re-
spective analyses: EM 2 = 4.34%, EM 3 = 11.2%, and Summed Emotion 
score= 8.78%. These are not large amounts of predictable variance. 
However, they are not insignificant either. 
Rosenthal (1984) has developed one method of dramatizing the 
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significance of predictable variance that makes this last conclusion 
clearer. Rosenthal has constructed the "binomial effect size display" 
(BESD) table to index the change in "success rate," "cure rate," etc. 
achievable with the use of any new procedure. Using the predictable 
variance estimates given earlier (28.8%, 11.2%, 8.78%, and 4.34%), the 
change in "success rate" achievable with the use of the circumplex 
model is, respecti.vely, from • 23 to • 77, • 33 tO • 6 7, • 35 to • 65, and 
• 40 to • 60. From this perspective the circumplex model does add a 
meaningful increase to the degree of variation in the empirical data 
which can now be conceptualized and further investigated. 
The inequality pattern of the rho-estimates simply indicate 
whether a circular model in general will fit the data. However, they 
do not in and of themselves indicate the adequacy of the specific model 
being tested (Wiggins et al., 1982). The data in Table 21 more 
specificially assesses the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) circumplex 
model. Here, the rho-estiamtes have been used to evaluate the per-
centage of variance attributable to the 5 kinds of principal compo-
nents which can be derived from a circumplex matri ·. The figures in 
the table suggest that a "general" and "specificity" component 
accounted for relatively uniform amounts of variation in the four 
analyses, i.e., approximately 13% and 8%, respectively. Within the 
limits of the present study it is not possible to further interpret 
these figures. 
Deviations from perfect polarity also accounted for relatively 
similar amounts of variation in the empirical matrices, approximately 
21.3%. This variance indexes the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) model 
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of the polarity relations between the four sets of emotions in the 
present study. This is clear when each of the polar opposite emotions 
(fear-anger, joy-sad, acceptance-disgust, surprise-expectancy) are 
examined in each of the empirical matrices. A sense for where de-
partures in polarity occurred can be obtained by counting the number 
of instances when polar emotions showed negative, zero-order, or 
positive correlations in the six matrices. Joy and sadness were corr-
elated negatively 4 times, and at a zero-order magnitude 2 times. 
Acceptance and disgust were negatively correlated in all 6 matrices. 
Surprise and expectancy were negatively correlated 4 times, positively 
1 time, and at a zero-order value 1 time. Fear and anger showed the 
largest number of deviations from polarity being positively correlated 
2 times and at a zero-order magnitude 4 times. Thus, deviations from 
polarity between the emotions of fear and anger probably contributed 
most to the variance captured by the principal components measuring 
this deviation. 
Table 21 shows the variance attributable to deviations from per-
fect orthogonality across the four analyses. This variance indexes 
the adequacy of Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling of emotions in 
the present data. A sense for where the deivations are occurring can 
be obtained by inspecting the correlations proceeding downward through 
the columns of each table. Perfect orthogonality would be represented 
by a change in the magnitude and sign of the correlations correspond-
ing to the rho-inequality for circumplexity (rho 1 > rho 2 > rho 3 > 
rho 4, where rho 1 is positive, rho 2, zero-order, rho 3, negative, 
and rho 4, highly negative). Table 3 shows exactly how the pattern 
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should appear. Note, each column has a reversal point (e.g., column 
1: rho 1, rho 2, rho 3, rho 4, rho 3, rho 2, rho 1). Inspection of 
Table 18, which exhibits the best circumplexity, is revealing. There 
appears to be a subtle trend for deviations to occur where positively 
valenced emotions shift to negatively valenced ones. For example, 
joy and fear are separated by acceptance and therefore should show a 
zero-order correlation (i.e., as represented by rho 2). However, in 
5 of the 6 tables, they are negatively correlated with magnitudes 
ranging from -.5291 to -.0246. 
A visual sense for the deviations from polarity/similarity of 
the emotions in the EM data can be obtained from Figure 5. This figure 
graphs the loadings of the eight emotions on the first two principal 
components extracted from the empirical correlations in Table 19 (of 
the summed emotion scores). Table 22 presents the 8 principal com-
ponents which were extracted (by decision, using the SPSSX decision 
procedure for number of factors to be extracted), their eigenvalues, 
percent of variance accounted for by each, and the cumulative variance 
accounted for with each successive principal component. The factor 
matrix for the first three principal components, which have eigen-
values larger than 1, are also given in the table. Table 5, given 
earlier, presents the rotated factor matrix for these components using 
Varimax rotation and a Kaiser normalization. 
Figure 6 illustrates the roughly circular ordering of the 
emotions usi~g principal components 1 and 2 as axes for the variable's 
placement. There is a clear separation of the positively and negatively 
valenced emotions. However, fear and anger fail to show the degree of 
Table 22 
Principal Components Analysis of the Summed Emotion Scoresa Using 
the Raw Data Instead of the Rhob Estimates 
Percent Cumulative 
Principal of % 
c Eigenvalue Variance Variance Components 
Factor 1 2.89 28.6 28.6 
Factor 2 1.31 16.4 45.0 
Factor 3 1.28 16.0 61.0 
Factor 4 .96 12.0 73.0 
Factor 5 .83 10.4 83.4 
Factor 6 .53 6.6 90.0 
Factor 7 .45 5.7 95.6 
Factor 8 • 34 4.4 100.0 
Factor Matrix d Principal Components 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Disgust .62670 • 25977 .39729 
Sad .53904 .16783 .48524 
Anger .51628 -.37627 .18278 
Fear .46394 .69796 -.23752 
Surprise .39139 .41158 .51908 
Accept -.50467 .08519 .64059 
Joy -.56065 .57632 .13066 
Anticipate -.63320 .28079 -.31052 
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Table 22 (continued) 
aThe summed scores are the average intensity score for an emotion 
across all 5 early memories per subject. 
bOrdinary least square estimates of the population correlation. 
cCalculated with unities in the matrix diagonals. 
dOnly Factors 1-3 included. Others have eigenvalues less than 1. 
Table 4 is the rotated factor matrix for all 8 factors (emotions). 
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Joy • 
FACTOR 
2 
( .46) Fear 
Anticipate • 
Surprise 
Digust 
a 
Accept 
(-. 5) (. 53) 
(-. 37) 
Sad 
Anger 
1 
FACTOR 
The factor loadings for the eight emotions on the first and 
second principal components extracted from the emotion summary 
scores (i.e, the average intensity score for each emotion per 
subject). N = 48. 
bFour points on the four axes are given for reference. 
cEPI = The Emotions Profile Index. 
Figure 6. Plot of the Factor Loadings for the 8 EPia 
Emotions on Principal Components 1 and 2: 
The Summary Emotion Scoresb,c 
llO 
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polarity exhibited by the other emotions. And, in addition, the 
positions of the polar emotions of surprise-anticipation and accept-
ance-disgust precede sad-joy which differs from the ordering found in 
Plutchik's (1980) similarity scaling solution. 
One can conclude from these analyses that circumplexity can be 
found in varying degrees, from fairly good to absent, in the emotions 
rated in EMs. Thus, a circular ordering appears to be of some useful-
ness in representing the magnitude of correlation between emotion 
variables in EMs. However, there are deviations from perfect polarity 
and orthogonality [when Plutchik's (1980) model is used as the refer-
ence model] that must either be accounted for, or, failing this, one 
must conclude that an alternative circumplex model may be constructed 
to provide a better fit to the empirical relations between emotions in 
EMs. Pursuit of this would require additional research with larger 
samples and direct analyses of empirical relations between emotions. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Survey Characteristics of Early Memories 
Comparison of the general content characteristics of EMs ob-
' tained in the current study with those in the Kihlstrom and Harac-
kiewicz' (1982) research suggests that EMs for a college age group 
do share structural similarities. Since only general features of EMs 
were studied, little can be said about them. Five EM features, how-
ever, appear to warrant further discussion. These will now be 
considered. 
Mean EM age. An older mean EM age was observed in the present 
study. The older age in the present study can probably be attributed 
to the larger number of EMs requested of the current subjects, five 
instead of the "earliest" in the previous research. It has long been 
recognized that individuals can recollect very few memories from 
childhood (Schachtel, 1947). This may reflect either developmental 
processes (Schachtel, 1947; White & Pillemer, 1979), or it may simply 
reflect a "decay" process for memories. Rubin (1982) has shown that 
the number of memories recalled from one's past is a log-linear func-
tion of the age period from which the memories are requested. In 
other words, the number of memories available from each period of life 
decreases systematically as a function of time. Requesting subjects 
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to recall more than the "earliest" EM would logically seem to require 
that older EMs be expected in the sample. 
Percentage of previous recall data. Reqesting more than 1 EM 
would seem to be a logical explanation for the differences observed 
with this variable as well. However, an additional psychological 
factor (i.e., separate from a memory "decay" account) may be impli-
cated. Kihlstrom and Harackiewicz (1982) observed that approximately 
93% of their EMs were previously recalled whereas only 76% were so 
rated in the present experiment. A decrease of 17% when 5 times as 
many EMs were requested does not seem an overly large difference. 
Yet, the difference between the percentages is highly significant 
statistically,~= 3.40 (.£. <.01). Perhaps the most reasonable inter-
pretation to draw is that there is something especially memorable 
about the "earliest" EM as previous researchers have speculated (Adler, 
1956; Olson, 1979). Only further research can determine what this 
might be. Again, however, the difference between the two studies 
(one of the "earliest" EM and one of five EMs) can probably be 
attributed to methodological differences. 
The "self-seen" variable. The percentage of EMs rated as 
having this feature differed across the two studies (66.3% versus 
58.1%; z = 1.75, E. <.05). In addition, a sex difference was observed 
in the present study with women rating more of their EMs (73.3%) as 
having this quality than did the men (48.5%). It does not seem 
likely that methodological differences between studies can account 
for either of these differences. And, providing an account of the 
differences using data obtained in the experiment or in theories of 
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recollection is difficult. 
The occurrence of the "self-seen" variable in autobiographical 
memories does, however, appear noteworthy. While upon first inspec-
tion the percentage of memories rated as having imagery of the physi-
cal self seemed overly large, this may not be the case. 
Freud (1901/1965) noted that the "self-seen" variable appears 
to be unequivocal evidence that some type of imaginative elaboration 
of the memories had taken place. Nigro and Neisser (1983), drawing 
upon Bartlett's (1932) theory of recollection as "reconstruction" 
arrive at a similar conclusion. Such imagery cannot occur through 
perception. It must have been "added" to the memories after initial 
encoding into memory. These authors also provide empirical evidence 
that older and more emotional autobiographical memories are the ones 
most likely to have imagery of the physical self. These three facts 
(i.e., evidence for imaginative elaboration, older and more emotional 
memories more likely to have the feature) combined with a more general 
perspective on the nature of the recollective process can be used to 
understand this feature of EMs. 
The perspective on recollective processes alluded to is known 
as the "generation-recognition" model of recall (Anderson & Bower, 
1973; Norman & Bobrow, 1979; Reisser, in press; Reisser, Black, & 
Abelson, 1985, Reisser, Black, & Kalamarides, in press). According 
to this model, remembering autobiographical experiences takes place in 
at least two stages. The first stage involves the generation of a 
plausible "scenario" (Reisser, in press) or "description" (Norman & 
Bobrow, 1979) of the memory that is used to cue retrieval of 
corresponding memories. The second stage involves recognition 
processes that evaluate the extent to which retrieved memories are 
the one(s) sought or riot. 
Reisser's studies (see references above) of the "strategies" 
that subjects use to generate initial retrieval scenarios for auto-
biographical events reveal that certain connnon types of "general" 
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and "personal" knowledge and comprehension processes are involved. 
Basically, scenarios utilize the same knowledge and understanding 
processes involved in comprehending everyday events. Thus, when 
subjects attempt to retrieve a personal memory, they initially gen-
erate scenarios including the following types of information and 
knowledge: knowledge of actions, persons, events, places, and times. 
For example, when asked, "Where were you eight weeks ago on Satur-
day?", subjects may utilize their general knowledge of the months in 
the year to determine that 8 weeks ago was in July. Furthermore, 
they know from personal knowledge that in July they were on vacation 
visiting relatives. The specific relatives were "Uncle Jim" and "Aunt 
Sarah." This process of using general and specific knowledge contin-
ues in an iterative process that eventually provides a specific 
enough scenario with which to attempt recall of a specific event 
that Saturday. 
It seems quite plausible that visual imagery of the self inter-
acting with others in a specific place, in a specific way, and at a 
specific time, i.e., highly concrete detail, would emerge at some 
point in this iterative process of recollection. Furthermore, visual 
imagery may be quite functional for furthering recollection in at 
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least two ways. Bartlett (1932) noted that an image often guided 
the recollective proc~ss and that subsequently retrieved detail was 
used to "flesh out" the image. The image may further recollection 
by being used as a specific cue for further memories (a "guiding" of 
recall); and, as well, such an image may be useful in retaining 
memory detail already retrieved as the process of recollection con-
tinues (Bartlett's "fleshing out" of the memory). 
When autobiographical memory is viewed in this way, it seems 
less unusual that visual imagery including the physical presence of 
the self might occur. Furthermore, it does not really seem surprising 
that subjects would incorporate this "self" imagery into their subse-
quent representations of the event. Having remembered something in 
great detail it would only seem reasonable to retain as much of the 
detail as one could. 
One could go on to discuss the pitfalls of such imaginative 
elaborations of memory--indeed, some researchers have begun to do so 
(Loftus, 1979)--but I think this would miss the essential point. 
Autobiographical memories are not about "objective events"; rather, 
they are highly personal and of ten creative constructions that serve 
as "anchors" for self-identity (McAdams, 1985) and self-appraisal. 
A less common use of autobiographical memory entails the recollection 
of the "facts." Given the more common use of autobiographical memory 
we can marvel at how accurate it can be. 
Finally, Nigro and Neisser's (1983) data make a great deal of 
sense within the context of the explanation just given. Older 
memories are often more difficult to recollect. Therefore, one would 
117 
expect subjects to utilize more elaborate retrieval processes to 
remember them. Emotional memories, in turn, may be the ones subjects 
expend the most effort and time to recollect. Thus, age and emotion-
ality may be interacting with more generic features of autobiographi-
cal recollection (i.e., the use of scenarios, gradual reconstruction, 
iterative retrieval, etc.) to produce a higher incidence of the 
"self-seen" feature in EMs. Thus, the "self-seen" variable may not 
be so unusual after all. We may conclude with Nigro and Neisser 
(1983) that autobiographical recollection, rather than more restricted 
forms of memory, may be the best place to study the types of imagin-
ative reconstructions so inherent in memory processes (noted long 
ago by Adler, 1956, 1969; Bartlett, 1932, Freud, 1901/1965) but 
seldom adequately addressed by current research. 
"Screen memories." The data obtained suggest that Freud (1901/ 
1965) made a perspicuous observation about EMs with the four qualities 
defining "screen memories." Such memories are not as banal as they 
might at first seem. When the content of such memories is coded for 
the presence of the eight EPI emotions they are not as neutral in 
affective content as subjects rate them to be. Subjects' "neutral" 
ratings are systematically related to the presence and intensity of 
emotions in EMs as can be seen from TablelO. Subjects who recall 
more "screen memories" report experiencing more negative affect and 
less positive affect in their current lives and in their memories. 
Since this type of EM has well-defined characteristics, further 
research certainly appears warranted on the psychological factors 
involved in their occurrence. One avenue to pursue in light of 
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Freud's (1901/1965) ideas might be to assess subjects' perceived 
levels of family conflict as indexed by Schwarz's (Schwarz & Zuroff, 
1979; Schwarz & Getter, 1980) measuring instrument. Would subjects 
with higher levels of perceived family conflict also remember more 
"screen memories"? 
The Emotional Content of Early Memories 
The data gathered in Tables 7 and 8 represent the investigator's 
coding of the eight EPI emotions in EM content. As noted earlier, 
fear, surprise, joy, acceptance, and expectation are the most common 
emotions rated in EMs. What is also apparent in these tables is 
that multiple emotions are present in EMs. This has several implica-
tions for MDR studies and perhaps for an understanding of the signi-
ficance of EMs for subjects at various times in their lives. 
All but a few of the studies conducted on MDR, except for 
Bower's (1981) experiment 4, have examined the effects of two polar 
emotions upon memory. It was pointed out earlier that this conceptual 
convenience runs counter to the occurrence of multiple emotions in 
naturalistic affective states (Izard, 1971, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 
1980; Tompkins, 1962, 1963; Wessman & Ricks, 1966). It may also 
entail a loss of power to observe MDR effects especially when moderate 
to low intensity mood states are studied. Prior to the data collected 
in Table 7 and 8, however, the basis for these assertions lay in an 
extrapolation from naturalistic studies of affective states to 
emotional influences on memory. The present data provide direct 
empirical evidence that multiple emotions are encoded into the content 
of EMs. Therefore, subsequent studies ignoring the presence of 
multiple emotions in memories will do so with a known risk (i.e., 
Type 1 errors in statistical judgments) that need not have been 
accepted. 
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The presence of multiple emotions in EMs may also be relevant 
to understanding the often changing significance of childhood memories 
for subjects (Olson, 1979). Previous studies have observed that sub-
jects reconstruct their EMs somewhat differently when under varying 
emotional or motivational report conditions. For example, Burnell 
and Solomon (1964) observed that military recruits before and during 
basic training, a high "stress" condition, altered their EM content 
somewhat. Specifically, the content of the memories reported during 
basic training were rated as having more themes reflecting emotional 
dependency and aggressive impulses. Similarly, Tobin and Etigson 
(1968) found that aged individuals prior to and during institution-
alization altered their EM content. With a similar aged non-insti-
tutionalized group as controls the hospitalized group were observed 
to recall their EMs with more thematic material reflecting "death" 
and "loss" during the time they were committed. 
The presence of multiple emotions in EMs may help explain this 
phenomena as follows. Bower (1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) has shown 
that subjects in particular emotional states often make cognitive 
evaluations and judgments that are congruent with their emotional 
state. For example, happy and sad subjects made judgments of the 
same set of facial photographs in terms of the affective character-
istics of the persons portrayed. Sad subjects "saw" many more sad 
features to the facial pictures while happy subjects "saw" many more 
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happy features. The same phenomena may be true of subjects recalling 
their EMs. However, rather than interpreting this as an emotionally-
induced "distortion" of the reality of the events encoded, it may 
reflect instead an alternative evaluation based on emotional features 
ignored while in a polar emotional state. Surely the most signifi-
cant events in a person's life are often amenable to different inter-
pretation and evaluation at different times. 
Some researchers prefer to interpret the revisions of personal 
history that can be obtained from subjects at different times as a 
reflection of a less benign process. Greenwald (1980), for example, 
attributes such revisions to the operation of a "totalitarian ego." 
Such an "ego" exercises "hegemonistic" control over the cognitive 
apparatus so as to distort the "reality" of the past. Perhaps such 
revisions need not always reflect so tendentious a process. Instead, 
they may reflect the influence of emotional states upon perception, 
cognition, and memory. It is less sensible to conclude that one 
emotional state is the "correct" or "real" perspective with which to 
view events than to perceive it as one of many valid and "real" 
alternatives (based on the multiple emotions which individuals are 
capable of experiencing). Indeed, such revisions of personal history 
may be indicative of adaptability rather than "maladaption." The 
capacity to perceive new features of one's past, to imaginatively 
"re-vision" (Hillman, 1975) one's present and future, may be the 
most adaptive capacity individuals possess. The effects of emotions 
on perception, thought, and memory may be central to this capacity. 
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Mood-Dependent Recall of Early Memories 
The predictions of the current study, based upon the literature 
review in Chapter II, were largely supported by the results. Table 13 
shows that MDR can be observed for EMs. Furthermore, the intensity 
of the mood state appears to moderate the degree of MDR observed 
(compare Table 11 and 13). Thus, it appears that MDR is non-linearly 
related to the intensity of mood states. Subjects at moderate moods 
show a different recall pattern than do subjects at more extreme 
mood intensities (see Figure 5). 
The present study observed asymmetric MDR regardless of the 
method of classifying subjects. Therefore, the details of Hypothesis 
5 were not supported. However, this may be due to the limited range 
of mood-intensities studied in the present experiment. Further 
research with a larger range of mood-intensities therefore appears 
warranted. 
Studying a larger range of mood-intensities may also help 
clarify the "moderates" effect observed in Figure 5. It is not at 
all clear why subjects at more moderate moods would recall more sad 
EMs than "sad" subjects and fewer happy EMs than "sad" subjects. 
Possible reasons for the "moderate" effect may be the presence of 
more discrete negative emotions in moderate mood states as would be 
predicted by Plutchik's model (1980; see Figure 3). A second reason 
may be that there is an interaction between the distribution of 
emotions in memories and the distribution of emotions in naturally 
varying mood states. This would be the prediction of the encoding 
specificity principle account of MDR (Bower, 1981). Clearly, both 
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more data and more precise conceptualization are required to explain 
the pattern of recall observed in moderate mood states. 
Circumplexity Between Emotions in Early Memories 
Circumplexity was observed in 4 of the 6 analyses conducted on 
the emotions rated in EMs. The circumplexity observed in EM 5 was 
the most clear-cut evidence observed. Several assumptions were made 
in conducting these analyses and it is instructive to review them 
now in light of the data obtained on the survey characteristics of 
EMs. 
The most basic assumption was that circumplexity exists between 
emotions in naturalistic mood states (Diener & Emmons, 1985; Plutchik, 
1980). Second, it was assumed that memories of experiences would 
encode "features" pertaining to each discrete emotion. Third, it 
was assumed that such "features" could be identified and rated for 
"intensity" from the recall reports produced by the subjects. And 
fourth, it was assumed that subjects could reliably produce reports 
that would reflect the relation between each emotion as it naturally 
occurred at the time of the experience. Of these assumptions the 
fourth appears to be the most problematic in light of the data 
obtained in the present study. 
The discussion of the "self-seen" variable presented earlier 
makes this clear. There can be little question that a large percen-
tage of EMs have undergone some degree of imaginative elaboration. 
This elaboration theoretically would be expected to influence both 
the MDR and the circumplexity analyses. However, of the two types 
of analysis the latter would probably be most adversely affected. 
123 
It really matters little for MDR when emotions are encoded into 
memories. It is simply the congruency between current mood and 
affective quality of the memories which is predicted. However, the 
second and fourth assumptions stated above are critical for the cir-
cumplexity analyses. If the EM content contains some blending of 
emotions present during the initial experience and the blend present 
during later encodings, the resultant pattern might not reflect the 
relations between emotions in naturalistic affective states. In 
retrospect, EMs may not have been the best place to search for cir-
cumplexity between emotions. 
The circumplex hypothesis constrains every relation observable 
in a matrix of correlations. Therefore, it is noteworthy that 
varying degrees of circumplexity were observed between emotions in 
EMs. Bower's (1981) research strategy for varying four emotions 
across encoding and retrieval conditions may be the only truly direct 
way to examine the implications of circumplexity between emotions 
upon MDR. In light of the present results such strenuous research 
effort appears definitely worthwhile. 
Bower's (1981, 1983; Gilligan & Bower, 1984) research has 
demonstrated pervasive and extensive influences of emotions upon 
memory, thought, and perception. Further research should be con-
ducted in a more orderly way taking into account the naturalistic 
relations between emotions in affective states. In addition, each 
discrete emotion may have different functional impact upon memory, 
cognition, and perception. Izard (1977), Plutchik (1980), and 
Tompkins (1962, 1963, 1979) have made many suggestions in this 
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regard. For example, a sad emotion may produce little mood-congruent 
learning because it often leads to the withdrawal of attention from 
the environment. However, joy, fear, and anger may have the opposite 
effect since each emotion is obviously related to what is going on in 
the environment around the subjects. The present study represents 
additional evidence consistent with these theories in that emotions 
are organized not only in naturalistic states but in memories as well. 
General Conclusions 
The current study adds to the growing body of research demon-
strating the influence of emotions upon memory processes. Chapter I 
reviewed previous MDR research and concluded that variability across 
studies in the degree of MDR obtained might be attributable to fail-
ure to adequately conceptualize and experimentally control the 
natural parameters of emotions, i.e., their similarity, polarity, 
and intensity. The present study provided mixed evidence in support 
of this conclusion. 
Specifically, MDR was observed with EMs but fully synnnetric 
MDR could not be demonstrated. Furthermore, intensity was shown to 
moderate the degree of MDR. Given the range of mood intensities 
studied, the present research in retrospect can be seen as failing 
to achieve sufficient "power" with which to observe the hypothesized 
relationships. Finally, circumplexity was observed in varying 
degrees between emotions in EMs. Thus, a circumplex model of emotions 
was shown to be useful in understanding some of the variation between 
emotions in memories. 
How might future research on emotional influences upon memory 
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and other cognitive processes proceed? Most generally, I think that 
future research must begin to consider the naturalistic expressions, 
characteristics, and relations among discrete emotions. Two principle 
areas for future research are as follows. Further data is required 
on the relations between emotions in naturalistic affective states. 
Plutchik's (1980) model is primarily based on similarity judgments 
between affective terms. Work conducted by Diener and Emmons (1985) 
indicates the more preferred strategy for studying emotional states. 
Unfortunately, however, this last research did not investigate the 
entire circumplex model. Therefore, a research study to accomplish 
this is currently underway. 
The usefulness of a circumplex model for understanding MDR can 
only be fully tested by more directly studying the influence of sev-
eral discrete emotions on memory. Since Bower (1981, experiment 4) 
has already studied the effects of joy, sadness, fear, and anger, an 
initial study in this direction might investigate the effects of 
disgust, acceptance, expectancy and surprise. 
Aspects of the circumplex model can be tested in other ways as 
well. One of the predictions made from Figure 4 was that the blending 
between emotions in affective states will vary depending upon the 
intensity of each emotion present. This prediction is independent of 
MDR but also has implications for it. A preliminary test of this 
feature of the model can be made by assessing the varying relation 
between emotions as a function of emotional intensity. This could 
be studied both in the context of MDR and in natural mood states 
alone. Both of these studies are essential. The "moderates" effect 
shown in Figure S may ultimately be unravelled by this type of 
study. 
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The importance of determining the validity of Plutchik's (1980) 
model for understanding the interaction between emotion intensity and 
MDR (as well as other influences or emotions on behavior) was recently 
highlighted in a series of "connnentary" articles on a recent failure 
to obtain mood-congruent learning (MCL). Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Shaft, 
and Doren (1985) reported a failure to obtain MCL when a large sample 
of "sub-clinically depressed" college subjects were studied. These 
authors state that their subjects were chosen, despite their very 
low levels of "depression" (probably more accurately identified as 
moderately sad), because they assumed that 1) mood has an underlying 
linear dimension of intensity, and 2) that mood-intensity is linearly 
related to degree of MDR (Hasher et al., 1985). 
Failing to find MCL with their subjects they retract both 
assumptions in their reply article (Hasher, Zacks, Rose, & Doren, 
1985). There is no basis for doubting a linear dimension of mood-
intensity in their data; only the latter of the two assumptions 
is logically invalidated by their results. It must be stressed that 
these investigators used unusual care in measuring the moods of their 
subjects and they also made repeated mood measurements to ensure 
that their subjects maintained their mildly sad mood levels through-
out the study. In other words, this was a carefully executed and 
thorough study within the limits of what is currently known about 
emotions. 
The connnentary articles on this study are similarly instructive. 
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Ellis (1985), Isen (1985), and Mayer and Bower (1985) offered a rich 
variety of speculations on why MCL was not observed. However, most 
of this was directed toward non-emotion factors that could increase 
the methodological precision of emotion-influence studies. In 
addition, Isen (1985) concluded that asymmetric MCL and MDR had been 
routinely observed, therefore it must be a systematic phenomena. 
Ellis (1985) speculated that emotional intensity moderated the 
degree of MDR but he could give no reasonable account of why this 
might be the case. Mayer and Bower (1985) offered a similar hypoth-
esis about mood-intensity and they also noted that different induc-
tion procedures might produce differing combinations of emotions. 
However, no one suggested that emotion polarity, similarity, and 
intensity might be interactive dimensions of emotions moderating MDR 
and MCL. Instead, subject factors, variations in materials used, 
and interactions between materials and moods were offered as the 
primary accounts for MDR and MCL variability. 
It seems to be more parsimonious to consider characteristics 
directly related to emotions as moderators of MDR and MCL, as was 
done in Chapter II, than to speculate about non-emotion factors. If 
emotion intensity modulates the similarity and polarity relations 
between discrete emotions in affective states, then a unified 
account of MDR and MCL variability may be possible. This would 
certainly be more valuable than the proliferation of non-emotion 
factors currently being suggested as accounts for variability across 
separate studies. 
Several caveats and conclusions can be drawn from the present 
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study and the literature which has been reviewed. First, emotions 
need to be more adequately conceptualized using the data available 
from studies of the naturalistic expression of emotions (e.g., Diener 
& Emmons, 1985; Ekman, 1982; Izard, 1971, 1972, 1977; Plutchik, 1980; 
Tompkins, 1962, 1963, 1979). Emotions are not just the "evaluative 
component" of cognitions. They are much more fundamental than this. 
One of the more profitable ways to study the relation between 
emotions and cognitive processes may be to recognize that they inter-
act temporally (Lewis, Sullivan, & Michalson, 1983). Such temporal 
interactions may be understood quite directly through the use of 
Tulving's (1983) "encoding specificity principle." This principle 
provides a very broad generalization about the interaction between 
encoding and retrieval processes. It may be worthwhile to see how 
far this principle can go in explaining mood-cognition effects before 
the introduction of alternative and less cohesive accounts. 
Focusing upon the temporal integration of cognition and emotion 
would be quite consistent with a current trend in personality and 
motivational theory. Theorists are increasingly recognizing the need 
to conceptualize their variables in dynamic-temporal rather than 
static-atemporal terms (Atkinson, 1983; Atkinson & Birch, 1978; 
Klinger, 1977; Martindale, 1982; McClelland, 1985). Pervin (1985) 
has suggested that much of the recent trend toward ''cognitive" 
approaches to personality and motivation stems from a dissatisfaction 
with "trait" approaches. Such approaches appear to do injustice to 
the rich variability that can be observed in the actions of individ-
uals over time and across situations. However, at a theoretical 
129 
level cognitive-developmental approaches (Damon, 1985) are as static 
as "trait" models of behavior. Such models assume an inherent 
stability to cognitive processes within "stages." Transition between 
"stages" is said to occur; but, once achieved, subsequent variability 
in cognitive processes is neither expected or predicted. It is 
treated, perhaps inappropriately, as "measurement error." 
The opposite would be true of a theory of personality and 
motivational processes conceptualized in dynamic-temporal terms. A 
suggestion toward this end was made earlier in the interpretation 
of the "self-seen" variable. If personality-motivation is concep-
tualized as an independent system of processes interacting over time 
with cognitive and memory processes, then there may be a true 
possibility for understanding the intricate and subtle changes in 
the behavior of individuals in different situations and at different 
times. A valuable source of data toward this end may be the 
"unique" (Greenwald, 1981) effects of emotions upon thought, per-
ception, and memory. 
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E.R. No. 
Name: Age: __ Sex: Date:_/_/_ 
* Early Memories Recording Form 
In the space provided below please write out a description of your 
earliest memory (or if you have already reported the earliest one, 
then another early memory). Please think back to your childhood, going 
as far back as you can possibly go, and then write a description of 
this recollection in detail below. Please do not report something that 
someone else has told you about. Only report a memory you are sure 
you can remember yourself. 
Please be reasonably complete in your recollection and write as legibly 
as you are able. After you have finished, please go on to the next 
task as directed by the person administering this study. 
How old were you at the time of the event you remembered? Please 
estimate your age to the nearest birthday: 
~~- years 
How clear was the memory? Check one: 
Cloudy Clear Vivid 
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Is the memory you have described one that you just thought of on being 
asked, or is it one that you have thought of before? Check one: 
~~- Remembered just now 
~~-
Thought of occasionally before 
~~-
Thought of often before 
What was the feeling involved in the memory? Check one: 
Pleasant 
~~-
Neutral 
~~-
Unpleasant 
~~-
More specifically, briefly describe the emotion(s) that were associated 
with the memory (for example, happiness, anger, or surprise): 
What specific sensory images did you experience while you were 
recalling the memory? Check each one that applies: 
Vision (seeing) Gustatory (taste) 
Audition (hearing) Olfactory (smell) 
Tactile (touch) Kinesthetic (movement) 
If vision was involved, was the memory image in black-and-white or 
in color? Check one: 
Black-and-white Color 
If vision was involved, did you see yourself in the memory, or did you 
see only what others were doing about you? Check one: 
Saw myself 
~~-
Saw others only 
If you saw yourself, briefly describe what you saw yourself doing: 
Please add any other comments that might be of interest regarding your 
earliest memory: 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
APPENDIX B 
Early Memories Rating Form 
Please answer the following questions about the early memories you 
wrote down earlier in this study. The questions will require that 
you look over your previous answers. Please take the time to do so. 
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1.) Most people can usually judge whether some things are more 
meaningful and important to them than others. This is usually 
true even in situations where all of the things being judged are 
important in some way or another. Please make this judgment 
about the five early memories you reported earlier. When you are 
making your judgment, however, I would like you to be considering 
how personally meaningful to you the recollected memories are 
in terms of your current life interests, hopes, wishes and 
feelings. When you make your judgment please keep in mind that 
what is being judged is the overall feeling of meaningfulness 
for you of the memories. 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
(Most meaningful • Less meaningful) 
Please write the number of the early memory which belongs in each 
numbered slot. The "number of the early memory" is at the top 
of the sheet where the memory is written. 
APPENDIX C 
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Introduction to the Early Memories Study: Consent Form 
This study is about the earliest memories that people have of 
events, or experiences, in their lives. If you decide to participate 
in the study you will be asked to recall five (5) of the earliest 
memories you can recollect in your life. Your very first memory 
should be one of the memories you report. You will be asked to write 
a narrative description of each memory and to answer several questions 
about each recollection. All of these questions will be given in 
the form of a questionnaire, so you will be able to take as much time 
as you like in answering. Since this study is based on the assumption 
that each person's memory reflects the integrity of the person, 
several non-memory questionnaires will also be given to you to com-
plete before and after the recollection portion of the study. 
All of your written answers will be kept strictly confidential. 
Please feel free to answer these questions without inhibition. Your 
true feelings, thoughts, and memories can be expressed if you wish. 
If you are willing to participate in this study, please sign 
your name and the date in the space provided below to indicate this 
willingness. 
Name: Date: 
APPENDIX D 
Coding Emotions in Early Childhood Memories: 
A Coding Manual1 
1This coding manual is based upon an earlier version developed by 
Wynne and Plutchik (1974, unpublished manuscript). 
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Introduction 
This manual provides guidelines for coding the presence and 
intensity of eight basic emotions in Early Childhood Memories (ERs). 
The emotions coded by this manual are drawn from the work of Robert 
Plutchik (Emotions, New York: Harper & Row, 1980); and the present 
manual is a revised version of the manual developed by Plutchik and 
Wynne (1974, unpublished manuscript). The current manual adopts the 
basic form and content of the previous manual and introduces changes 
primarily designed to amplify and clarify material already present in 
the first version. 
Emotions can be described in several ways. The emotion of fear, 
for example, can be described in subjective "feeling" terms like 
fright, terror, etc. However, the emotion of fear can also be 
described and amplified by terms referring to behavior (e.g., avoid-
ance, withdrawal, etc.), to functions (e.g., protection), and to 
character traits (e.g., timid, shy, etc.). Plutchik (1980) has 
argued a similar structural relationship underlies the relatedness 
of these different "languages" of emotion. 
The redundancy between these different languages of emotion can 
facilitate the rating of emotions in ERs. Thus, while each of the 
eight emotion coding scales provided below are identified by a sub-
jective "feeling" term, notice that each coding scale also includes 
material related to each of the four different "languages" of emotions 
just described. This means that it is not necessary for an ER to 
contain an explicit reference to a subjective "feeling" term for an 
emotion in order for that emotion to be identified and coded as 
present. Evidence for the presence and intensity of an emotion should 
be sought by using these four languages of emotion, not just be refer-
ence to subjective feeling terms. Priority, however, especially in 
cases of doubt, should be given to subjective references. 
The basic process of coding the ERs is as follows. First, deter-
mine whether an emotion is at all present. Second, if an emotion is 
judged to be present, make a judgment concerning the intensity of the 
emotion using a three-category scale: low, medium, and high. Third, 
judge the intensity of the emotion as either high or low within the 
category (low, medium, high) just previously mentioned, i.e., having 
decided fear at a low intensity is present, make a further two-part 
distinction, and decide whether it is a low level, low intensity 
expression, or a high level, low intensity expression of fear. In 
effect, you will have a seven-point scale for rating each emotion: 
zero (O) = emotion is absent; one (1) = low, low intensity; two (2) 
= high, low intensity; three (3) = low, medium intensity; four (4) 
= high, medium intensity; five (5) = low, high intensity; and six (6) 
= high, high intensity. 
Only rate emotions experienced by the "hero" (i.e., the remem-
berer) of the ER. Intensity judgments are to be made using the 
underlying intensity scale implied in the language of the memory 
(e.g., irritated, angry, and enraged imply an increasing level of 
intensity), and by the underlying scale implied in the language 
describing the actions and events depicted (e.g., "I pushed him," 
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"I hit him in the face," and "I beat him senseless" imply an increas-
ing level of intensity to the emotion of anger). 
Qualifications of actions, feelings, and events within the ER 
can be used to judge intensity as well (e.g., "I swore at him. It 
must have really scared him because he looked frightened."); however, 
qualifications of the entire ER should not be used in rating inten-
sity of the emotional (e.g., "this is a very vague memory," when 
given as a qualification, for example, to the immediately preceding 
example, should not be used to decrease an intensity rating). Notice 
that reference to feelings, behaviors, functions, and traits are all 
used in determining the presence and intensity of emotion. 
To simplify the rating task you will be asked to rate sets of 
ERs for one emotion (and only one) at a time. Do not try to recall 
your previous ratings when judging the presence and intensity of 
suceeding emotions. Emotions can occur singly or in combinations. 
Therefore, rating one emotion at a time should facilitate more accur-
ate coding of any and all emotions present in the ER. You may notice 
that some statements imply multiple emotions, e.g., "I was laying on 
my bed when suddenly the door burst open, my brother walked in wearing 
a frightening halloween costume, and I was so happy to see him because 
he had been away so long, that I didn't yell at him for scaring me." 
This ER could appropriately be scored for surprise-startle, fear, and 
joy (and, if further information is given, perhaps even sadness-
deprivation). Please note, however, that your task when coding this 
ER is to consider only the single emotion you are presently coding 
for. Do not be concerned with whether other emotions are present; 
you will have a chance to exercise this sensitivity to the presence 
of multiple emotions when each emotion is coded in turn. 
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THE ANTICIPATION SCALE 
4 5 6 0 
absent 
1 
very 
slightly 
2 
slightly 
3 
fairly strongly very extremely 
strongly 
Scoring Criteria 
1.) Anticipation is indicated by feelings of expectancy, anticipa-
tion, curiosity, alertness, inquisitiveness, and vigilance (this 
is a curious alertness, not a fearful alertness): behaviorally 
this emotion is indicated by exploring, looking, listening, 
touching (i.e., sensory activity aimed at evaluating, locating 
and identifying things) etc.; functionally, this emotion is 
generally indicated by exploratory behavior; in the language 
of traits, anticipation is suggested by controlled behavior. 
2.) Be sure to distinguish anticipatory reactions to events which 
primarily indicate fearfulness (e.g., anticipating a fearful 
event) from the basic emotion of anticipation which is mo~e 
directly concerned with anticipatory inquisitiveness and explor-
ation. Score the former for fear, and the latter for antici-
pation. Exploration to alleviate a fear is scored. 
3.) Score incidents indicating an active desire or behavior directed 
toward getting to know one's current environment (or past or 
future, as well). 
4.) Score incidents evidencing feelings of curiosity and desire to 
explore and manipulate things. 
5.) Often anticipation is indicated in statements emphasizing the 
sensory aspects of events (e.g., loudness, bright, shining colors, 
as in "There was a loud noise, I couldn't figure it out," or 
"The bright shining colors were fascinating."). 
6.) New play experiences imply exploration or inquisitiveness. 
7.) Amazement is a combination of surprise and exploration. The 
surprise component is stronger, therefore, when assigning an 
intensity score be sure to assign a lower score for the antici-
pation component (e.g., an amazement response might be assigned 
a four (4) on the surprise dimension and a two (2) on the anti-
cipation dimension to rate this differential contribution to 
these two basic emotions to the experience of "amazement."). 
IF ANTICIPATION IS ABSENT, ASSIGN A SCORE OF ZERO (0). 
LOW INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 1 or 2) . 
Seeking new experiences: "It was a very hot, sunny day, and I was 
searching for something to do." 
Achievement: "In the first grade, I remember·learning how to print 
and draw, I became a very good painter and won a contest at a 
state fair for printing and drawing." (Comment: this involved 
a new learning experience which implies the willingness to 
explore a new activity, the score is for this exploration.) 
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Sensory Activity: "My favorite glass had orange juice in it, and it 
had a bunch of folds at the bottom too"(a picture of the glass 
was drawn to accompany the description). (Comment: this 
description indicates a strong sensory attraction to the object 
described, and this visual attraction results in a detailed 
visual knowledge of the object which implies visual sensory 
exploration of the object.) 
Work Memories: "Helping my father fix the car before a long journey." 
(Comment: fixing an object requires prior diagnostic assessment 
of the problem which is a type of exploratory behavior.) 
MEDIUM INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 3 or 4) 
Exploring Things: "The earliest memory I can recall is rummaging 
through my grandmother's attic. I recall finding many inter-
esting things such as an old army uniform, ice-skates, and 
other objects." (Comment: finding implies prior search, and 
indeed the person reports "rummaging.") 
Sensory Activity: "I remember a great deal of sunshine in the room. 
Either my sister's clothes or the bedspread was pink. I also 
remember yellow pastels--perhaps the sunlight. I don't remember 
any specific emotion except sunlight and a definite aura of 
pastel colors." (Comment: scored for visual exploration of 
details) 
Work Memory: "I also remember being able to cook and help with the 
dishes around this time, something I did frequently." (Comment: 
both activities imply ordered, and hence anticipated sequences 
of acts; furthermore, the qualify "frequently" suggests this 
was a routine involvement in these activities.) 
Manipulation: "Making paper airplanes. We folded them, about a 
hundred of them, and I can still see them spread out on the 
couch." (Comment: This activity requires attention to detail, 
i.e., exploration of the materials and the goal; while the 
number produced gives a sense of the extended nature o.f this 
attention.) 
Expectancy: "I remember hoping the baby would be a girl. My father 
called the doctor who arrived after what seemed an interminable 
delay." 
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MEDIUM INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (continued) 
Curiosity: "I remember asking my parents about animals, and cars, and 
all sorts of things, all of the time." (Comment: The activity 
of questioning and its frequency are the basis for scoring this 
memory.) 
Fascination: "There was a bridge over the stream which seemed quite 
deep. This fascinated me, for there seemed to be caves along 
the sides of the stream." (Comment: Fascination, like amaze-
ment, involves both expectancy and surprise. The detailed 
description of a new environment implies visual exploration.) 
HIGH INTENSITY ANTICIPATION (score 5 or 6) 
Fascination: "I also remember teacher giving me my first science book 
(astronomy) which caught my interest and kept me reading one 
astronomy book after another that year and for many a year 
thereafter." 
Excitement: "He pushed me in the cart way across town and we went to 
some drug store. I was so excited at the time." (Comment: 
this activity is scored as exploratory, the intensity judgment 
is based on the qualifying statement made about excitement.) 
Sensory Activity: "I named the colors of the store fronts, automo-
biles and merchandise as we passed. This became a standard 
activity during walks. My parents pointing to items and my 
labeling it with its colors. There were numerous people and 
much excitement during this time." (Comment: This is being 
scored for the exploration of the environment described, the 
new learning involved, and the qualifier about the intensity of 
the experience.) 
Note: Cognitive-processing such as worry about the future, or a 
specific events, planning, etc. imply anticipation. Be sure 
to distinguish fearful cognitive-processing from the type of 
exploratory activity which is being scored as anticipation. 
Only score for this emotion when the cognitive-processing 
which is being described involves a clear reference to explor-
atory action of some kind, e.g., trying to resolve an issue, 
deal with a problem, etc. Otherwise, examine the extent to 
which emotions such as fear and sadness might not be more 
appropriate emotional influences to consider. 
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THE DISGUST SCALE 
0 1 3 4 5 6 
absent very 
slightly 
2 
slightly fairly strongly very 
strongly 
extremely 
Scoring Criteria 
1.) Disgust is indicated by feelings of revulsion, loathing, sarcasm, 
dislike, aversion, intolerance, and often prejudice; behaviorally 
by avoiding contact with, moving away from, lying (by rejecting 
the truth); functionally by tendencies to reject people, places, 
events, or things; and by character traits of dogmatism, dis-
belief, and distrust. 
2.) Avoidance due to fear is not scored for disgust. 
3.) Often indicated by avoiding new experiences. And, by tendencies to 
prejudice individuals or events in negative ways. 
4.) Bitterness is partly disgust and partly anger. 
5.) Shame is a combination of disgust and fear. 
6.) Scorn, indignation, resentment, and contempt are combinations of 
disgust and fear. 
7.) Feeling betrayed is a combination of anger, disgust, and fear. 
8.) Humiliation is a combination of sadness, anger, and disgust. 
IF DISGUST IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O) 
LOW INTENSITY DISGUST (score 1 or 2) 
Rejecting People: "The girl next door called to me to play with her on 
her swings. I pretended I didn't hear her and ran onto the 
porch." 
Avoiding New Experiences: "Thinking that I never wanted to grow up 
because things were going so well." 
Boredom: "When I was four years old I was asked to be a mascot at a 
high school graduation. I wore a white evening gown and fell 
half-asleep part way through the program." 
MEDIUM INTENSITY DISGUST (score 3 or 4) 
Rejecting Situations: "I decided not to cry from pain and consequently 
refused to say I was sorry. My friends told me not to walk on 
thin ice but I did anyway." 
Aversion: "I remember feeling an uneasiness as she washed the vaginal 
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area. I used to try to avoid letting her touch me there." 
Prejudging Events Negatively: "It was my longest stay away from home 
in a strange environment which I just knew I wasn't going to like." 
Intolerance: "When I was four years old, my older sister was in a 
hospital. She came home with all her hair shaved off. I laughed 
at her." 
Dislike: "I didn't like my teacher." 
HIGH INTENSITY DISGUST (score 5 or 6) 
Disgust: "My uncle forcing me to eat lima beans (which I disliked 
intensely) in order that we go to a parade. Since we were in a 
restaurant at that time, I ate them, and promptly vomited. The 
time I ate cheese and grapes and vomited. I was a very ugly 
child." 
Loathing: "He had a beard and I loathed his kissing me on the forehead." 
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THE SADNESS SCALE 
0 1 2 
slightly 
3 4 5 6 
absent very 
slightly 
Scoring Criteria 
fairly strongly very extremely 
strongly 
1.) Sadness is indicated by the individuals' reports of feelings of 
sadness, grief, loss, depression, mourning, melancholy, sorrow, 
nostalgia, distress, pessimism, sentimentality, detachment, de-
jection, and loneliness; behaviorally when the individual cries, 
acts distressed, attempts to withdraw into self, gives, up, etc.; 
functionally sadness is expressed in efforts to reintegrate, i.e., 
to reestablish contact with the lost, or unattained (unattainable) 
object; inthe language of traits, sadness is indicated by 
depression, moodiness (sad), and pessimism. 
2.) Common events referred to are getting lost with an emphasis on 
sorrow rather than fear; if no affect is mentioned the Early 
recollection should be scored low. Indicates by states of 
deprivation: tiredness, hunger, disability. Reference to unfair 
treatment, injustice, etc. 
3.) Jealousy should be scored partially sadness (deprivation), par-
tially anger (destruction). 
4.) Embarassment is sadness and surprise. 
IF SADNESS (DEPRIVATION) IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O) 
LOW INTENSITY SADNESS (score 1 or 2) 
Getting Lost: "I got lost from my mother. I couldn't find her and 
finally a lady brought me to the police station." 
Being Sent to Bed: "I was sent out of the room and up to bed." 
MEDIUM INTENSITY SADNESS (score 3 or 4) 
Loss of Desired Object: "He tied the balloon on my finger, but somehow 
it got away. I was miserable the rest of the day." 
Deprived of Desired Object: "My uncle gave everyone a piece of chewing 
gum for eating their spinach, but he wouldn't give me any until 
I ate mine." 
Melancholy: "I became very sad listening to the violin music." 
Disappointment: "We dug until we were tired, but found no treasure. I 
was tired and disappointed." 
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Sadness: "I somehow remember feeling depressed about being alone and 
inside on a fine summer day. Because I was small I was always 
getting beaten up." 
HIGH INTENSITY SADNESS (score 5 or 6) 
Loneliness: "Later I heard he had been killed in an auto accident. I 
felt very horrible but I always cherished his ring." 
Grief: "Some boy scratched the doll's eyes out. I don't think I 
have ever again been so heartbroken." 
Getting Lost: "I got lost from my family and I was so unhappy. I 
thought I'd never find them again." 
Loss: "My mother took me and left me at school. I thought she would 
never come back for me." 
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THE JOY SCALE 
0 1 2 
slightly 
3 4 5 6 
absent very 
slightly 
Scoring Criteria 
fairly strongly very extremely 
strongly 
1.) Joy is indicated by the individuals' reports of feelings of 
happiness, joy, pleasure, sexual gratification, passion, delight, 
sensuality, love, ecstasy (more mildly by contentment, calmness, 
relief) and often by serenity; behaviorally, joy is often 
indicated by laughter, amusement, giving, kindness, sympathy, 
pride, sexual attraction (and behavior); functionally, joy is 
indicated at the most abstract level by the idea of reproduction, 
which implies courting, mating, etc., and the overall "thrust" 
of the emotion is for sensual contact and the reproduction of 
self. (The logic here is illustrated in altruistic behavior 
where the individual is much more likely to engage in altruistic 
acts when feeling joyful, fulfilled, etc., in effect reproducing 
itself in the person helped.) In the language of traits, joy is 
indicated by gregariousness, altruism, confidence, pride, and 
optimism. 
2.) If feelings of joy, happiness, satisfaction, etc. occur in the 
context of food, receiving gifts, then the memory should be scored 
on the acceptance-incorporation scale. Activities which indirectly 
refer to acceptance-incorporation, e.g., "We had a great time when 
we went shopping at the grocery store" do receive a score on the 
joy scale. 
IF JOY IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0) 
LOW INTENSITY JOY (score 1 or 2) 
Warm Ties: "I loved being allowed to go to the hospital when he was 
brought home and being able to hold him." 
Contentment: ''My grandmother made all new clothes for it and I was 
quite content." 
MEDIUM INTENSITY JOY (score 3 or 4) 
Warm Ties: "I loved being allowed to go to the hospital when he was 
brought home and being able to hold him." 
Pleasure: "He just walked in and kissed my mother and then he came 
over to my twin's and my crib and picked us up. Then we had 
dinner. I felt very happy and we were all in a good mood.,.-
Satisfaction: "It gave me satisfaction to know I could win the 
battles." 
Happiness: "A girl taking me to my first halloween party and the 
wonderful time we had." 
Sensuality: "I had a means of achieving sexual enjoyment by placing 
my hand under my penis and moving my behind up and down." 
HIGH INTENSITY JOY (score 5 or 6) 
Joy: "I loved the snow and enjoyed playing in it immensely." 
Ecstasy: "It was an absolutely thrilling experience." 
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0 1 
absent very 
slightly 
Scoring Criteria 
THE SURPRISE-STARTLE SCALE 
2 
slightly 
3 
fairly 
4 
strongly 
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5 6 
very extremely 
strongly 
1.) Surprise is indicated by reference to feelings of wonder, amaze-
ment, astonishment, puzzlement, distraction, strangeness, shock, 
etc.; behaviorally, it is indicated by orienting attention 
towards the object eliciting the emotion and often ceasing other 
activity (note: orienting away from, moving away from, escaping 
the thing which elicited the surprise can occur and these 
responses are more properly conceptualized as subsequent to the 
initial surprise, see Criteria 2 below); functionally, this 
emotion is the orienting response, a transitory behavior resulting 
from some unexpected object, or experience. In the language of 
traits, this emotion is dyscontrolled behavior (e.g., hysteria). 
2.) In general the emotion of surprise is followed by some other form 
of emotional behavior such as joy, fear, anger, etc., which simply 
reflect a specific evaluation of the object. 
3.) Awe is a combination of fear and surprise. 
4.) Embarrassment is surprise and sadness. 
5.) Disappointment is surprise and sadness. 
6.) "Shock" often refers to surprise and disgust, fear, or anger. 
7.) Revulsion often refers to surprise and disgust. 
8.) Outrage often refers to surprise and anger. 
9.) Surprise is often indicated by the following emotion terms: alert, 
fascination, confusion, wonderment, bewilderment, etc. 
10.) Surprise is often indicated in the narrative style used to des-
cribe an event. This is a style characterized by lack of coherence 
and cohesion. For example, continuity, predictableness, and 
narrative "telegraphing" are missing. "We were drawing pictures 
when this boy next to me pissed in his pants." The conjunction 
"and" conjoins events that are spatailly and temporally contiguous 
but does not reflect the narrator's cognitive integration of the 
events. 
11.) Surprise is often indicated by sudden alterations in the percep-
tion of self and others, e.g., "My sister and I felt like grown-
ups when it happened." 
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IF SURPRISE-STARTLE IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0) 
LOW INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 1 or 2) 
Mild Surprise: "My first day at school was very interesting and I was 
surprised to find that some children were crying." 
Mild Confusion: "I was playing with a ball, and there seemed to be 
all sorts of other kids around, too, all doing something or other." 
MILD INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 3 or 4) 
Puzzlement: "I walked back to the car in puzzlement." 
Confusion: "I remember how confused I was as to what the big mechan-
ical contraption would be able to do." 
Wonder: "I looked over the pantry door and wondered why the servant 
signal did not work." 
Amazement: In amazement I put my hands on my head and looked to the 
ground and she took my picture. 
HIGH INTENSITY SURPRISE (score 5 or 6) 
Astonishment: "I can't help remembering how shocked I was the first 
time I saw her. All of a sudden a pedestrian ran up and pushed 
me out of the way of the car." 
Awe: "I walked around through the debris and was awed at all the 
damage." 
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THE ANGER SCALE 
0 1 2 
slightly 
3 4 5 6 
absent very 
slightly 
Scoring Criteria 
fairly strongly very extremely 
strongly 
1.) Anger is indicated when the individual reports feelings of anger, 
hostility, frustration, irritation, etc.; behaviorally, when the 
individual engages in behaviors such as hitting, pushing, yelling, 
rough and tumble play, etc.; functionally, by destroying, 
breaking, harming; and by character traits of punitiveness, 
aggressiveness and belligerence. 
2.) Pride, especially at the expense of others, is partially anger 
and partially acceptance. 
3.) Bitterness toward others is partially anger and partially disgust, 
or rejection. 
4.) Anger is often indicated by references to such affects as: 
irritation, annoyance, discomfort, and defiance. 
5.) Yelling, when done in happy excitement is not scored. 
6.) Conventional activities (e.g., games, play, etc.) when 
involving active, strenuous, physical effort, or activity 
(e.g., wrestling, chasing, jumping on something) are scored 
for anger. 
7.) Actions engaged in by the hero which do not appear to will-
fully or intentionally involve destruction, but do have this 
result, especially through carelessness, are scored. The 
idea is to score strongly assertive and physically strenuous 
acts as having the quality of aggressiveness. 
8.) Score for the presence of this emotion even if the overall 
story, or the ending, imply a different emotion is involved 
as well. 
IF ANGER IS ABSENT, OR NOT PRESENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0) 
LOW INTENSITY ANGER (score 1 or 2) 
Annoyance: "They kept looking at me, and I was annoyed at them." 
Irritation: "I would become very irritable when awakened from sleep." 
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MEDIUM INTENSITY ANGER (score 3 or 4) 
Attacking People: "When I was about five years old, my sister and 
I were fighting in a big chair. I knocked her out of the chair 
and she hit her head on the radiator." 
Hostility: 'T remember fighting with my sister because I thought my 
mother liked her better." 
Frustration: "I was unable to throw or catch the ball with any 
accuracy. I had tried everything, but it was impossible because 
I was so uncoordinated." 
HIGH INTENSITY ANGER (score 5 or 6) 
Destroying Things: "I threw my bottle on the street and smashed it 
to pieces." 
Frustration: "I would get angry at somebody. I would bang my head 
against the wall and continue until I got my way. I had been 
relegated to the seat upon her birth and I deeply resented it." 
Rage: "He took my doll and I was so furious I kicked him." 
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THE FEAR SCALE 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
absent very 
slightly 
slightly fairly strongly very extremely 
strongly 
Scoring Criteria 
1.) Fear is indicated when the individual reports subjective feelings 
of fear; behaviorally, when1he individual engages in escape or 
avoidance behavior; functionally, by efforts to protect oneself 
or others; and by character traits of timidity. 
2.) Common events referred to are painful events, or to the exper-
iencing of pain, discomfort or injury. 
3.) Often indicated by reports of feelings of fear, anxiety, panic, 
or apprehension. 
4.) Fear is indicated by reference to such related emotion terms as 
shyness, social inhibition, lack of assertiveness, anticipation 
of fearful or frightening events, humiliation, terror, obedience 
(when unwilling), or guilty ruminations. 
5.) Often indicated in stories of getting lost, or of being left alone, 
especially when the emphasis or focus of the narration is upon 
feelings of fear, panic, apprehension, etc., instead of upon 
sorrow. 
6.) Guilt is partly joy and partly fear. 
7.) Awe is partly fear and partly surprise. 
IF FEAR IS ABSENT, OR NOT PRESENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (0) 
LOW INTENSITY FEAR (score 1 or 2) 
Painful Events: "I fell down and hurt my knee." 
Timidity: "Once I went to the bathroom in my pants because I was too 
shy to ask to go the girls' room." "Besides, I was too afraid 
of the toilet because it made so much noise when it flushed." 
MEDIUM INTENSITY FEAR (score 3 or 4) 
Painful Events: "I remember lying on my bed crying after being 
punished." 
Shame: "The teacher rebuked me sternly and I felt angry and upset." 
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Fears: "Waking up after an operation and feeling the weight of both 
casts on my legs. I was frightened." 
Embarrassment: "Finally my father insisted I remove the roll from my 
mouth and when I did the blood rushed down from my mouth. I 
was pretty embarrassed." 
Fleeing: "I remember being afraid of the waves, running away each 
time one would break." 
HIGH INTENSITY FEAR (score 5 or 6) 
Humiliation: "I managed to fall over backwards and land on my head, 
and everyone around laughted. The headache was nothing compared 
to the humiliation I felt." 
Terror: "When I was very small, about two, I vaguely remember my 
mother hurriedly picking me up and carrying me into a closet 
and turning out the light; we were both standing in pitch 
darkness and I was very frightened." 
Apprenehsion: 
all sorts 
they were 
"I can remember looking down under the sheets and seeing 
of crazy animals and then screaming because I thought 
going to hurt me." 
Panic: "I remember being covered with wasps, and being almost 
hysterical with fear." 
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THE ACCEPTANCE SCALE 
0 1 2 
slightly 
3 4 5 6 
absent very fairly strongly very extremely 
slightly strongly 
Scoring Criteria 
1.) Acceptance is indicated when the individual reports feelings of 
acceptance, trust, agreeableness, or linking; behaviorally, when 
the individual engages in affiliative, friendly actions toward 
another person, or thing (e.g., caring, soothing, comforting, 
hugging, grooming and physical care for another); functionally, 
it is indicated by trust, and incorporation into one's life, 
feeling, thought, and most fundamentally into one's body (e.g., 
eating, swallowing, etc.); in the language of traits, acceptance 
and incorporation are indicated by acquisitiveness, receptivity, 
cooperativeness, and at the extreme by avarice, gluttony, passive 
compliance. 
2.) Acceptance is often implied in interpersonal acts (make-believe 
play, family outings, conjoint work, etc.) which presume, or are 
psychologically predicated upon, the presence of conjointly 
negotiated or established perspectives on an event or activity. 
For example, in make-believe play, one person might state, "You 
be the cowboy, and I'll be the Indian," with the respondent 
replying, "Bang, I just shot you with my colt 45." The respondent 
must have accepted the first person's basic psychological perspec-
tive upon the ensuing activities for the reply to be interpreted 
and understood correctly. Joint play implies a medium level 
intensity score of acceptance. Single play implies a lower level 
of intensity, unless other information indicates otherwise. 
3.) Common events often scoreable as acceptance refer to eating, 
receiving gifts, affection, accepting favors, and by reference to 
concern for other's or one's own physical, or emotional status. 
4.) Acceptance is often indicated by reference to being with one's 
family or friends, or by seeking group membership, or cohesive-
ness; in general, by reference to the desire to be "with" 
people. 
5.) Cooperation between persons, or sharing with others, is often 
indicative of acceptance. Note, reference to specific individuals 
often implies joy and acceptance. 
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6.) Acceptance should be distinguished from joy by the overall 
"thrust" of the experience. Acceptance involves an "inward 
movement" of incorporation. Joy-gregariousness usually involves 
a more "outward" oriented thrust to the experience which is aimed 
at making contact with the object of the joy. 
7.) Acquiescence often indicates acceptance. 
8.) Feeling honored by others indicates acceptance. 
9.) Stealing implies a medium level acceptance of the stolen object. 
10.) Touching another implies a medium level of acceptance. 
11.) Friendship implies a medium level of acceptance of the other who 
is the friend, especially if friendly actions occur. 
IF INCORPORATION IS ABSENT, THE SCORE IS ZERO (O) 
LOW INTENSITY INCORPORATION (score 1 or 2) 
Accepting People: "There was a fat old man who slept in the bunk above 
me and who used to tell very nice stories./ " ••. my grand-
father helping me put on my shoes." 
Oral Intake of Food: "Whenever I went to the corner butcher shop I 
would get a piece of bologna if I could spell it out." 
Acceptance: "I remember being given a puppy." 
MEDIUM INTENSITY ACCEPTANCE (score 3 or 4) 
Receiving Gifts: "She was very nice and brought them down to our 
apartment. I felt very happy that she had brought us a present." 
Liking People: "I also developed my first close relationship with a 
boy my age playing cowboy and Indian games./ I wanted to be her 
friend." 
Incorporation: "I took the best care of it I could because it was the 
first animal I could call mine." 
Acquiescence: "Every morning she would kiss us and make a big fuss 
about us." 
Admission: "My teacher took me over to some of the other girls in 
my class and that day I met one of my closest friends." 
Receptivity: "I had three imaginary friends I would have long con-
versations with them and really believed they were real." 
HIGH INTENSITY ACCEPTANCE (score 5 or 6) 
Oral Intake of Food: "My mother gave me a piece of chocolate cake. 
I remember cake as the best one she ever made." 
Receiving Gifts: "My grandmother called me to say a friend was at 
the back door. I opened the door and saw my father, a true 
friend with a brand new bike for me." 
Covetousness: "As I got involved in the game, I decided I wanted 
all the marbles that everyone had." 
Gluttony: "The table was so full of food I remember eating and 
eating until I was so stuffed that I could hardly move." 
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CODED AFFECT SUMMARY SHEET 
Subject no: 
ER 1 ER 2 ER 3 
1.) Anger Anger Anger 
2.) Fear Fear Fear 
3.) Surprise Surprise Surprise 
4.) Expectancy _· _ Expectancy _· __ Expectancy __ 
5.) Disgust Disgust Disgust 
6.) Acceptance Acceptance Acceptance __ 
7.) Joy Joy Joy 
8.) Sad Sad Sad 
ER 4 ER 5 
Anger Anger 
Fear Fear 
Surprise Surprise 
Expectancy Expectancy 
Disgust Disgust 
Acceptance Acceptance 
Joy Joy 
Sad Sad 
X Affect Score 
1.) Anger 9.) Sum Pas. Affect (4,5,7) 
2.) Fear 10.) Sum Neg. Affect (1,2,3,5,8) 
3.) Surprise 11.) Sum Affect Score (1-8) 
4.) Expectancy 12.) Score 9/11 (ratio pas.) 
5.) Disgust 
6.) Acceptance __ 
7.) Joy 
8.) Sad 
APPENDIX F 
On Estimating the Variation From the Empirical Matrix of 
Correlations That is Used in the Circumplex Analysis 
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The simple ratio of the variation of the rho-estimates divided 
by the variation of the rho-estimates plus the Mean Squared Residual 
(MSR) can be used to estimate the variation from the empirical matrix 
which is used in the circumplex analysis. The MSR = Sum (r - rc)2 
where r refers to each of the 28 empirical correlations and re refers 
to each of the rho-estimates. Since the four rho-estimates are 
entered into the 8 x 8 theoretical matrix given earlier in Table 3, 
the latter can be used to determine which rho-estimate is subtracted 
from each empirical r. 
The total variation in the empirical matrix of correlations is 
given by: Sum (r - r 2). This variance can be analytically partitioned 
into two independent sources of variation each of which can be esti-
mated by the MSR and the variance of the rho-estimates about their own 
mean value. The empirical rand the Fe are equivalent since the rho's 
are estimated from the empirical matrix. Therefore, the variance of 
the rho's is predicted variation resulting from circumplexity in the 
matrix. However, the MSR is the deviation of the empirical correla-
tions from the rho-estimates. The MSR is, therefore, a direct func-
tion of the extent of departure between the values in the empirical 
matrix and the matrix of rho-estimates. In effect it "indexes" how 
well the rho-matrix fits the actual empirical correlation matrix. 
With this in mind it is possible to demonstrate that the sum of 
the MSR and the variance of the rho's is equal to the total variation 
in the empirical matrix. The total variation in the empirical matrix 
can be partitioned into two components as follows: 
~(r = r) 2 = [(r - r) - (r - r)J 2 . 
c c 
The first component on the left side of the equation is the MSR while 
the second component is the variation of the rho's around the empir-
ical mean r. The latter refers, of course, to variation created by 
circumplexity in the matrix. Then: 
Sum (r - r ) 2 + (r2 - r) - 2(r - r )(r - r) 
c c c c 
Sum (r - r ) 2 
c 
Thus, the total variation in the empirical matrix can be estimated by 
the MSR plus the variance of the rho's around their own mean value. 
Then the ratio given earlier estimates the variation from the empir-
ical matrix which is used in the circumplex analysis based on rho-
estimates. 
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